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After post here from Jennifer MacLeod, a smallholder with poultry in Canada, seems worth starting thread on relationships between farms, H5N1 and wild birds.
H5N1 (of Guangdong goose 1996 lineage) that’s causing trouble is a product of poultry farms: evolved in them, to become a “vicious chicken killer” (Wendy Orent). Now, however, as well as impacts on wild birds – and impacts on wild birds arising from panic over H5N1 – getting farms affected too.
Here, not the place for terrible impacts on farmers who have H5N1 devastating their flocks; instead, more re biosecurity, especially concerning small farmers – who in places such as Canada and Holland are having to take measures to guard their flocks from H5N1 infection by wild birds.
The post from Jenny:
引用：I am on Gabriola Island, British Columbia, Canada. Our small farmers are fighting the inane regulations of both provincial and federal governments. Already in Quebec, free-range and organic poultry have been banned from public sale as of January 1st, 2006. Farmers in the Province had six weeks to comply with these regulations brought out in November 2005. It orders all poultry to be raised for public sale must be raised “under cover” as a protection from Avian Influenza.
We in BC are trying to head off similar Provincial restrictions, and are battling new directives which affect our abattoir situations. This is an area where we have had NO incidents or complaints concerning tainted foods, but the new upgrades to bring the smallhold farmer into an area of “high bar” requirements (equal to the exporters requirements) are so cost inhibitive as to leave half, if not more, of our smallhold farmers lookjing at closing shop.
This means a great reduction of suppliers in the fastest growing market in North America, the free-range and organic meat and egg market.
I have talked with Christine Bilg, the head of the Dutch Smallhold Farmers Alliance who have made presentations to the World Health Organization on behalf of Small Farmholds in her country and across Europe. She cites similar problems for smallhold farmers in Europe.
It seems to me we are really looking at the old scenario of agri-business against any other meat and egg producer. It smacks of the corporation solution (Monsanto) versus the independant food producer, the genetic diversity that this embraces and the threat to smallhold farms as a way of life.
I have been researching this for three years now. Think about these implications. Is it possible that we are looking at a campaign to allow only agri-food produfers to feed the public?article by Jenny:
引用：QUESTIONS ON IMMUNITY AND AVIAN INFLUENZA
And Its Affects on Sustainable Farming And Domestic Poultry
Jenny MacLeod, Gabriola Island, BCIMMUNITY AND DOMESTIC POULTRY
In 2004 there were over thirty-five commercial agri-food barns that were infected with Avian Influenza in the Lower Mainland section of British Columbia. Both low-pathology and high-pathology forms of AI were discovered in the same barn at the same time in some cases. In each barn birds were quickly killed or incapacitated by AI and finally destroyed by Canadian Food Inspection Agency employees.
All around these barns were commercial free-range, healthy backyard flocks in the open air.
Thousands of commercial backyard flocks were tested. Almost all the backyard flocks did not exhibit symptoms of illness. The birds in these flocks did not even carry ANTIBODIES for AI. We know this because the only test administered for AI was a test for AI antibodies, not a test that determined the active presence of the viable AI virus.
Nevertheless these healthy flocks were destroyed by the CFIA on the basis of PROXIMITY (five and then ten kilometers from an AI infected site) to sources of infection, not on the basis of infection.
I have these questions:
1 If AI was introduced in the open air by contact with wild birds, why weren’t all the surrounding outdoor backyard flocks affected? Did some factor prevent them from contracting AI? Presumably if they were exposed to the focal AI virus outbreak they also would have died.
2 Was AI introduced to the agri-barn birds through another vector?
3 If the backyard flocks had been quarantined instead of being destroyed immediately by CFIA personnel, would they have eventually contracted AI or would they have represented a “control group” that survived AI and could have been studied to further our understanding of AI in domestic bird populations?
4 There is no data available that outbred birds are more resistant to Highly Pathogenic AI. If the backyard flocks did not present antibodies for AI (of any type) that means that they never had any form of AI or that the birds were totally resistant to the AI virus. If the latter statement is true, could they pass on this genetic resistance to their offspring?
[Martin: total resistance v unlikely I believe; seems H5N1 highly lethal to all it infects, bar – with some strains – at least a proportion of ducks]5 Since the hybrid birds in the agri-barns were genetically uniform, did this make it easier for the AI virus to kill its avian host?
6 There is an increasing prevalence of Highly Pathogenic AI strains that thrive in intensive rearing situations. Since the hybrid birds in the agri-barn were genetically uniform did this make it easier for the low-path AI virus to mutate into a high-path form of the AI virus?
7 Unfortunately when the environment harbours highly pathogenic forms of AI (as is occurring in Eurasia) backyard flocks can then become part of the problem. If agri-barns were kept isolated from surrounding farms by legislated required buffer zones, would this remove the threat to smallhold farms and their livestock?
AI IMMUNITY IN WATERFOWL
At one time wild geese and ducks were singled out as the main vector for AI as they flew their migratory routes. Later it was realized that these birds were victims of the disease as much as domestic poultry and waterfowl were victims of AI. As I understand it the virus is carried in the wild bird population.
[Martin: seems it kills most wild birds too. Some ducks carrying it, but maybe only few strains, and it’s rare in the wild]Wild and domestic waterfowl carry AI antibodies (low pathology AI). This is so common that the CFIA stated in 2005 at the end of the AI incident in the Fraser Valley, that they were not going to test for it.
I have these questions:
1 If antibodies for AI are common in domestic waterfowl, does this mean that these birds have been individually infected (they have been at some time in their lives infected with low-path AI) or have the antibodies been passed down genetically from parent to offspring, and if so, for how many generations?
[Martin: as I understand it, are infected individually; low path AI pretty common in wild – almost like common cold in humans?]2 What kinds of low-path AI are they protected against?
3 Can this be taken as immunity and can this be bred into further generations of domestic birds?
[May be a few types of AI that enable resistance to H5N1 in ducks – evidence pretty slight so far; but I don’t believe passed down in DNA.]4 Is genetic diversity a factor in creating stronger waterfowl populations? Can we prove this?
[Doesn’t seem to be. Instead, seems ducks have some resistance – and then maybe only some duck species, to certain H5N1 stains]5 If they are immune to low-path AI does this mean they are protected against the high-path strains?
[Probably not, unless v few specific strains, in a few ducks; see above]6 Do the high-pathology forms of the virus exist separately as a rule in domestic birds or do they evolve from low-path opportunity-rich viral environments?
[H5N1 is unusual in being HPAI that has often entered wild bird populations; and can be carried by wild birds – tho perhaps not sustained by them eg the swans in Europe: as and when they die, will virus in the wild die with them, needing further infection from poultry]I believe that these are questions that should have been asked two years ago.
In the final days of 2005 I saw another brutal destruction of two barns full of domestic ducks in the Fraser Valley after the discovery of low-path AI antibodies in a few of the birds.
I have seen restrictions that prohibit free-range poultry and egg sales to the public and restrictions of one breed of poultry per farm in the Province of Quebec come into effect.
The CFIA still recommends that the only safe way to raise poultry for public consumption is “under cover” which entails the purchase of the barn unit, the individual cages for the birds, the mechanical means to feed the poultry, water the poultry and in the case of eggs, conveyor belts to deliver the eggs to the containers for sale to the public.
It means the hybrid chicks must be purchased from similar agri-barn environments, forced to grow to a set feed to meat ratio by the inclusion of hormones in their growth regimen, dosed with broad spectrum antibiotics for the duration of their brief lives and left in their crowded cages in the miasma of their own effluent until they are “harvested” and the agri-barn environment is finally cleaned.
This is the ideal of the CFIA in animal husbandry. This is what farmers who have raised poultry for meat and eggs all their lives will be reduced to, or lose their farms.
Why isn’t the Canadian Food Inspection Agency asking questions about Avian Influenza instead of blindly pursuing recommendations which have more of the feel of large corporate interest lobbying behind them than scientific study?
I believe that until these questions are answered we are simply allowing a situation to continue that has already proved disastrous for the poultry in agri-barn conditions and the people involved with their production.
There was a huge crisis in BC agriculture in 2004 in the Fraser Valley. Economically it was a true bio-disaster. Millions of birds were killed, thousands for no better reason than proximity to infected agri-barns. Hundreds of smallhold farmers never got compensation for their stocks of rare or endangered birds, or adequate compensation for their breeding stocks. Some stocks were so rare as to be irretrievably lost to the farmers that had nurtured bloodlines for generations.
We did not just lose birds in B.C. We lost the people who raised the birds. We lost smallhold farmers who were sources of free-range poultry and eggs, breeders of the heritage poultry and rare breeds. For some of these good, dedicated people the disaster was too great, the blow of losing healthy birds for no good reason was crippling in the extreme, financially and emotionally.
And yet here we are in 2006 with the same vulnerable hybrid poultry, the same opportunity-rich environment for Avian Influenza infection and possible mutation to high-pathology AI in the agri-barns and the same CFIA recommendations for keeping poultry “under cover”.
Free range poultry for meat and egg production and organically raised poultry are being treated as dangerous to the public in at least one province (Quebec) in 2006.
I am left with my biggest questions:
Why is the Federal Government ignoring the need for a study of AI and its causes and effects on small-scale agriculture and animal husbandry vs. large scale agri-business agriculture and animal husbandry?
Why is the Federal Government trying to make intensive farming manageable rather than working on farming practices that would make farming into a sustainable resource?
Why is the Federal Government under the auspices of the CFIA so bent on eradicating free-range and organic farming in this country?
It seems nothing of any value has been learned from this terrible agricultural, economic and public disaster, nor will anything be learned until somebody asks these questions and finds the answers.
Post edited by: martin, at: 2006/02/17 03:26
Post edited by: martin, at: 2006/02/17 03:32
article in The Guardian includes:
引用：iseases have spread from wildlife to humans throughout history but we now interact with animals in a very different way, says Danielle Nierenberg, a researcher with the US Worldwatch Institute. “In the last 40 years the world has gone through a livestock revolution, not unlike what happened to crops with the green revolution,” she says.Since 1961, she explains, worldwide livestock has increased 38%, to about 4.3 billion today. The global poultry population has quadrupled in that time, to 17.8 billion birds, and the number of pigs has roughly trebled to 2 billion. As the numbers of animals bred for food have vastly grown in a very short period, humankind’s relationship with them has changed.
“Raising animals has morphed into an industrial endeavour that bears little relation to landscape or natural tendencies of the animals. Wherever [industrial farming] is introduced it creates ecological and public health disasters,” she says.
Others argue that intensive confinement of animals promotes emerging viruses, stokes the development of antibiotic-resistant strains of bacteria and can transform animals into disease “factories”. According to Hans-Gerhard Wagner, an officer of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation based in Thailand, the “intensive industrial farming of livestock is now an opportunity for emerging diseases”.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/birdflu/story/0,,1715517,00.html
剛剛閱讀了來自國際非政府組織 (NGO) Grain 的新報告，該組織基於人們對遺傳資源和當地知識的控制，促進農業生物多樣性的可持續管理和利用。
看起來很棒。完整報告位於：
家禽遊戲：家禽業在禽流感危機中的核心作用以下是新聞稿：
穀物新品
2006 年 2 月 26 日GRAIN報告全球家禽業是禽流感危機的根源
穀物新聞稿報告指出全球家禽業是禽流感危機的根源
目前影響世界大部分地區的禽流感危機被不公平地歸咎於小規模家禽養殖和野生鳥類。 GRAIN 的一份新報告表明，跨國禽業是問題的根源，必須成為控制病毒的重點。 [1]
工業家禽生產和貿易網絡的蔓延為H5N1禽流感等致命病毒的出現和傳播創造了理想的條件。一旦進入人口稠密的工廠化農場，病毒就會迅速變得致命並擴散。來自受感染農場的病毒量濃厚的空氣可以傳播數公里，而綜合貿易網絡則透過許多載體傳播疾病：活禽、初生雛雞、肉類、羽毛、孵化蛋、雞蛋、雞糞和動物飼料。 [2]
「每個人都把注意力集中在候鳥和後院雞身上，」GRAIN 的德夫林·庫耶克 (Devlin Kuyek) 說道。 「但它們並不是高致病性禽流感的有效載體。病毒會殺死他們，但不太可能通過他們傳播。”
例如，在馬來西亞，H5N1病毒在村雞中的死亡率僅為5%，這表明該病毒很難在小規模雞群中傳播。寮國周圍都是受感染的國家，H5N1 流感疫情僅發生在該國少數的工廠化養殖場，這些養殖場由泰國孵化場供應。放養家禽（佔寮國產量超過 90%）中唯一的禽流感病例發生在工廠化農場附近。
「從2003 年的荷蘭到2004 年的日本，再到2006 年的埃及，我們一次又一次看到的證據表明，致命的禽流感在大型工業養雞場爆發，然後蔓延，」庫耶克解釋道。
今年早些時候，尼日利亞的疫情始於一個工廠化農場，該農場由一名內閣部長擁有，遠離候鳥熱點地區，但以進口不受監管的可孵化雞蛋而聞名。在印度，地方當局表示 H5N1 病毒是從該國最大的家禽公司 Venkateshwara Hatcheries 擁有的一個工廠化農場出現和傳播的。
一個迫切的問題是，為什麼各國政府和聯合國糧食及農業組織等國際機構沒有採取任何行動來調查工廠化農場及其副產品（例如動物飼料和糞便）如何傳播病毒。相反，他們利用這次危機作為進一步實現家禽業工業化的機會。禁止戶外家禽、排擠小生產者以及用基改雞重新飼養農場的舉措正在層出不窮。與一個從事一系列否認和掩蓋的行業共謀的網絡似乎已經完整。
“Farmers are losing their livelihoods, native chickens are being wiped out and some experts say that we’re on the verge of a human pandemic that could kill millions of people,” Kuyek concludes. “When will governments realise that to protect poultry and people from bird flu, we need to protect them from the global poultry industry?”
[1] The full briefing, “Fowl play: The poultry industry’s central role in the bird flu crisis”, is available at
http://www.grain.org/go/birdflu.
Spanish and French translations will be posted shortly.[2] Chicken faeces and bedding from poultry factory floors are common ingredients in animal feed.
親愛的馬丁，
Much like the recent article by Laurie Garrett, this article is peppered with statements and half truths that do not accord with the situation on the ground.
特別重要的是，小規模家禽中的許多疾病都未被診斷出來。在獸醫服務不發達的國家，只有當商業農場發生病例時，問題才會被診斷並引起獸醫當局的注意。
需要明確區分擁有健全生物安全系統（通常不會出現疾病）的農場和生產系統不足以防止病原體進入的農場。
我注意到寮國人民民主共和國再次被用作所有疫情爆發都發生在商業雞群中的地方的例子 - 但這些不是高水平的生物安全農場。
亞洲的大部分問題是由於農場為了滿足城市快速增長的家禽需求而發展的，而沒有同時加強農場生物安全（即後院雞群變得更大）。這並不是由大型跨國公司推動的，而是由看到服務這些市場的經濟利益的小農所推動的。這些農民在相當原始的條件下飼養更多的鳥類，並且沒有採取適當的疾病控制措施。解決這個問題的方法是加強這些農場的生物安全。
這篇文章還表明，該病毒需要在家禽中傳播才能致病。目前流行的 H5N1 病毒並非如此。這些病毒從進入雞群的那一刻起就已經具有高致病性，自 1996 年以來一直如此。
正如我多次指出的，這主要是一種家禽疾病，但將其出現歸咎於密集養殖是不正確的。
問候，
萊斯·西姆斯
Post edited by: martin, at: 2006/03/01 15:59
親愛的馬丁，
We still do not know the precise origin of Goose GD-96. There is a black hole in the data prior to this so the following is by necessity speculative but based on the best information we have.
I beleive that this virus initially emerged in geese. Goose raising in Guangdong involved a mixture of semi-intensive and extensive rearing. On one large farm I visited geese were reared in cages housing multiple geese on a farm surrounding a large dam in cages. After an initial rearing period on the farm they were sent out to graze paddies for about a month before returning to cages for final fattening – not exactly biosecure.
If we assume that this virus moved from its original wild waterfowl origin (originally as a low path virus) into geese there had to be an opportuinity for this to occur, which this type of farming provided.
Given the way poultry are sold in China and the consequent large amount of movement of live poultry, this virus would have spread through the live bird markets. It is probably in these markets where the virus acquired the genes that converted it to the 1997 strain poultry strain. Some say this happened in Hong Kong live poultry markets – it might have, but I remain sceptical on this. We will never know for sure but the Hong Kong experieince showed how these viruses could be easily propagated under the unsanitary conditions that existed in the markets then.
The original 1996-type virus persisted in geese until about year 2000 by which time it under went reassortment with other “avian” viruses of unknown origin (again presumed to be from aquatic birds) but these changes allowed the virus to multiply more readily in ducks, which was probably a key change in its genesis and further spread. It provided a much wider range of hosts, given the much larger number of ducks that are reared, and also provided the opportunity for infection of a wider range of wild birds.
Very few ducks are reared in intensive farms – they are reared on ponds, channels and paddy fields providing ample opportunity for exchange of viruses between domestic and wild birds. These ducks were sold live also providing ample opportunities for exchange of viruses between different species in the uncontrolled live bird markets in the region. What we do know is that from 1999 onwards a wide range of different reassortants arose including the Z genotype which was first recorded in Guangxi in 2001 apparently in ducks.
We don’t know exactly where all this occurred but it is likely that this involved transfer of viruses from geese to ducks to chickens and back again because the more recent viruses have features in the “N” gene that indicate adaptation to terrestrial poultry (the deletion of amino acids in the stalk of the NA protein).
My overall assessment is that the H5N1 viruses that have emerged did not originate in large industrial type farms but in semi-intensive and extensive farms and large live bird markets in which different species of poultry were mixed and housed together long enough for exchange of viruses/viral genes to occur.
問候，
萊斯
親愛的馬丁，
感謝您分享西姆斯博士的回覆。不幸的是，西姆斯博士評論的是我們的新聞稿，而不是我們的完整報告，這可能會產生一些混亂。我希望將來論壇的貢獻者，尤其是那些擁有專家資格的貢獻者，在發表評論之前花時間閱讀該報告。儘管如此，我還是想談談西姆斯博士提出的一些觀點。
西姆斯博士寫道：
引用：特別重要的是，小規模家禽中的許多疾病都未被診斷出來。在獸醫服務不發達的國家，只有當商業農場發生病例時，問題才會被診斷並引起獸醫當局的注意。西姆斯博士似乎在猜測。據我所知，沒有研究表明小規模家禽中的許多疾病未被診斷出來。相反，我們在許多國家看到的是，小農戶向當局詢問其農場內家禽神秘死亡的情況，而商業農場則採取措施掩蓋和否認其農場爆發禽流感。例如，在日本，當局只是因為一個匿名電話才發現該國最大的商業農場之一爆發了禽流感。在泰國，政府和業界幾個月來一直否認禽流感的存在，而小農場則在尋求答案。在印度，發生首次疫情的農場由南亞最大的家禽跨國公司擁有，聲稱這是另一種疾病，並指出在自己的實驗室進行了測試，但後來與獨立測試相矛盾。然而，儘管有這樣的記錄，該行業在很大程度上仍然是自我監管的，即使在禽流感導致人員死亡的印度尼西亞，當局在進入大型商業運營方面仍然遇到困難。所有這些以及更多內容都在報告中。
讓我提出我自己的猜測：商業農場的大部分疫情都沒有被報告。
西姆斯博士繼續說：
引用：需要明確區分擁有健全生物安全系統（通常不會出現疾病）的農場和生產系統不足以防止病原體進入的農場。我注意到寮國人民民主共和國再次被用作所有疫情爆發都發生在商業雞群中的地方的例子 - 但這些不是高水平的生物安全農場。
亞洲的大部分問題是由於農場為了滿足城市快速增長的家禽需求而發展的，而沒有同時加強農場生物安全（即後院雞群變得更大）。這並不是由大型跨國公司推動的，而是由看到服務這些市場的經濟利益的小農所推動的。這些農民在相當原始的條件下飼養更多的鳥類，並且沒有採取適當的疾病控制措施。解決這個問題的方法是加強這些農場的生物安全。
西姆斯博士所說的有些內容我是同意的，但是，重要的是要記住，西姆斯博士所說的大多數中型農場都緊密地融入了跨國公司的生產系統，通常作為合約生產業務。借用他的話來說，認為這些合約生產業務是小型後院農民熱切追求更大農場的結果，這當然是「半真半假」。多年來，正大集團等跨國公司積極推動此模式的推廣，各國政府也透過農業銀行和一系列激勵措施和法規支持其發展。以泰國為例，畜牧業是該國雛雞的主要來源，但只向農民出售數千隻雛雞。此外，在許多國家，例如寮國、緬甸或奈及利亞，大型商業農場通常不是由普通農民經營，而是由商人和政治機構成員經營。
我不想冗長地討論此類商業活動實際上對糧食安全和經濟發展有多大貢獻，但引用糧農組織亞太辦事處高級動物衛生和生產官員漢斯·瓦格納的話：“主要受益者[亞洲肉類]需求激增的主力是大規模、城市、資本密集型生產商和加工商以及城市中上層消費者。絕大多數窮人沒有受益。”
但讓我們回到生物安全的想法。禽流感，無論是H5N1 還是其他病毒，對於現代所謂的「生物安全」操作來說並不陌生。在我們的報告中，我們列出了現代工廠化農場中發生的幾次禽流感疫情：澳洲（ 1976 年、1985 年、1992 年、1994 年） ，1997年）、美國（1983年、2002年、2004年）、英國（1991年）、墨西哥（1993-1995年）、香港（1997年）、義大利（1999）、智利（2002）、荷蘭（2003）及加拿大（2004） ）。就 H5N1 病毒而言，許多跨國公司經營的工廠化農場都爆發了疫情：印度、越南、中國等。
這讓我想到了西姆斯博士的下一點：
引用：這篇文章還表明，該病毒需要在家禽中傳播才能致病。目前流行的 H5N1 病毒並非如此。這些病毒從進入雞群的那一刻起就已經具有高致病性，自 1996 年以來一直如此。– 注意：請參閱 Sims 博士的上述訊息，1996 年病毒再次出現
這不是我們在報告中所說的。我們並不是說 H5N1 病毒需要在家禽中傳播才能致病。我們所說的是，高致病性病毒不是在後院雞群中產生的，而是在工廠化農場中擁擠的、基因一致的、高度易感的雞群中產生的。有充分證據表明，低致病性病毒在工廠化農場內，甚至在超現代化的「生物安全」農場中，會進化為高致病性病毒。這可能是高致病性H5N1病毒的來源。我們的觀點是，新的高致病性病毒（禽流感或其他病毒）隨時可能從這些農場中出現，沒有理由認為我們不會很快看到新的 H5 或 H7 病毒肆虐。
我們還想說的是，工廠化農場以後院雞群和野鳥沒有能力的方式放大了這種疾病。在工廠化農場，死亡率通常為 100%；後院農場的溫度幾乎總是低得多。受感染的工廠化農場產生的病毒量可以透過進出工廠化農場並廣泛流動的許多管道迅速傳播——活體動物、雛雞、孵化蛋、飼料、機械等。
從根本上說，西姆斯博士提出的生物安全解決方案似乎使我們陷入了惡性循環。工廠化農場的生物安全發生了問題，隨之而來的是要求更嚴格控制的呼聲，導致新的開支、更大的農場和更嚴厲的干預措施，例如禁止戶外家禽和基因改造雞——劍橋大學的研究人員已經在追求這些。隨著這個循環的繼續，潛在的後果變得越來越大，不僅表現在大流行病毒釋放的可能性方面，而且還表現在對小農場、生物多樣性和當地糧食系統的破壞方面。我們在報告中指出，在越南，糧農組織承認，實施其擬議的家禽部門重組計劃（「生產區」）的一項內容將導致潛在的 100 萬小型商業生產者的收入損失。
新城疫等其他家禽疾病的經驗表明，小型農場可以有效控製家禽疾病並將損失降至最低。它們還有一個額外的優勢，由小農經營，為他們提供直接的收入來源、糧食安全和尊嚴。
正如我們在報告中所寫：
「對土地所有者來說，後院耕作並不是一種閒暇的消遣。它是亞洲和其他地區數億農村貧困人口糧食安全和農業收入的關鍵，為普通農村家庭提供三分之一的蛋白質攝取。亞洲幾乎所有農村家庭都至少養幾隻雞作為肉、蛋甚至化肥，它們往往是貧困農民唯一能負擔的牲畜。因此，鳥類對於多樣化的養殖方法至關重要，就像小農場家禽的遺傳多樣性對於家禽養殖的長期生存至關重要一樣。”
對於受禽流感影響的國家的人民來說，放養家禽生產比大型工廠化農場更有價值。需要採取有效措施保護這些系統免受禽流感的影響，即使這意味著停止工廠化養殖並尋求更永續和多樣化的家禽生產方式。不幸的是，各國政府卻反其道而行——犧牲後院家禽養殖和小農戶來保護政治上強大的產業。
——德夫林·庫耶克
糧食完整的 GRAIN 簡報「家禽遊戲：家禽業在禽流感危機中的核心作用」可在 http://www.grain.org。西班牙語和法語翻譯將很快發布。
來自理查德·托馬斯；以個人身分與國際鳥盟合作：
引用：特別重要的是，小規模家禽中的許多疾病都未被診斷出來。在獸醫服務不發達的國家，只有當商業農場發生病例時，問題才會被診斷並引起獸醫當局的注意。他的證據在哪裡？有間接證據顯示尼日利亞的情況並非如此，而且我發現很難相信其他幾個國家的情況。
需要明確區分擁有健全生物安全系統（通常不會出現疾病）的農場和生產系統不足以防止病原體進入的農場。
因此，承認即使那些擁有健全的生物安全系統的人也「通常不會受到疾病的影響」。情況並非總是如此——當他們得到它時會發生什麼？他們是出口最遠的最大單一生產商。
引用：我注意到寮國人民民主共和國再次被用作所有疫情爆發都發生在商業雞群中的地方的例子 - 但這些不是高水平的生物安全農場。美國農業部和糧農組織都使用這個術語來描述它們。
引用：亞洲的大部分問題是由於農場為了滿足城市快速增長的家禽需求而發展的，而沒有同時加強農場生物安全（即後院雞群變得更大）。這並不是由大型跨國公司推動的，而是由看到服務這些市場的經濟利益的小農所推動的。這些農民在相當原始的條件下飼養更多的鳥類，並且沒有採取適當的疾病控制措施。解決這個問題的方法是加強這些農場的生物安全。確實如此，但將產品運往世界各地的並不是這些農場。
這篇文章還表明，該病毒需要在家禽中傳播才能致病。目前流行的 H5N1 病毒並非如此。這些病毒從進入雞群的那一刻起就已經具有高致病性，自 1996 年以來一直如此。我對這篇文章的理解就是這個意思。
引用：正如我多次指出的，這主要是一種家禽疾病，但將其出現歸咎於密集養殖是不正確的。同意這主要是一種家禽疾病——那麼為什麼會誤導性地關注候鳥呢？糧農組織關於國際家禽貿易的報告在哪裡？
乾杯
理查貼文編輯：martin，發佈於：2006/03/02 11:47
這是來自日本的案例，大型農場明顯診斷出 H5N2（危險性低於 H5N1），但被掩蓋了。
農場中掩蓋 H5N1 病毒的情況/感染報告的出現速度非常緩慢。引用：茨城縣水戶市（共同社）警方週一逮捕了與茨城縣一家家禽養殖場經營者有關的四人，該經營者涉嫌隱瞞去年禽流感疫情。警方懷疑，IKN Egg Farms Co.的獸醫江口育夫（58歲）、前田芳男（53歲）、中村剛典（36歲）以及IKN員工中根智宏（32歲）違反了《家畜傳染病管理法》，該法要求報告任何疑似傳染病。在家禽。
消息人士稱，他們還懷疑獸醫應 IKN 獸醫的要求在茨城縣筑波國立動物衛生研究所進行的抗體檢測結果呈陽性。
筑波獸醫是 IKN 獸醫的熟人。
據稱，去年 8 月底，四名 IKN 員工未能向茨城縣政府通報疑似禽流感感染病例。
去年 12 月，警方搜查了 IKN 雞蛋農場和筑波研究所，並對獸醫進行了詢問。
消息人士稱，IKN Egg Farm 的獸醫還涉嫌透過提交從其他家禽養殖場採集的樣本，妨礙茨城縣去年 8 月在三個農場進行的禽流感檢測。
縣官員稱，該縣指控 IKN Egg Farms 在茨城縣經營的另外兩個家禽養殖場也犯下了類似的罪行。
自6月以來，茨城縣有40個農場發現禽流感感染，約580萬隻雞被迫被撲殺。
貼文編輯：martin，發佈於：2006/03/01 13:10
親愛的馬丁/德夫林/理查德，
Cases of human infection that occurred in villages in China, Thailand, Turkey and Viet Nam before poultry cases were reported, but detected retrospectively, provide the visible evidence of non-reporting in the smallholder/backyard sector. Humans should not be the sentinels for infection in poultry but, repeatedly, this has been the case.
In Viet Nam where I am working at present (incidentally, working on ways to protect the livelihood of the millions of households involved in rearing scavenging poultry) the Department of Livestock Production estimates that about 20% of the total chicken population(close to 40 million poultry) is in “semi-intensive” commercial flocks containing between 100 and 300 poultry. These are not part of integrated operations and are the flocks most at risk from H5N1 avian influenza because of their system of production and method of marketing. Ways need to be found to protect these poultry and some basic biosecurity (and vaccination) help to do so.
These are the farms I was referring to in my posting and not the flocks owned by contractors working for integrated companies, which are usually larger and practice reasonable biosecurity.
Anyone reading the Grain article would be led to your conclusion that “The deadly H5N1 strain of bird flu is essentially a problem of industrial poultry practices. Its epicentre is the factory farms of China and Southeast Asia”. However this statement is not consistent with the way H5N1 viruses emerged in Asia (through geese and live bird markets), with the lack of solid data on the exact mode of spread across Eurasia, with the key role of free ranging domestic ducks in the maintenance and spread of H5N1 viruses since about year 2000, and the occurrence of cases since late 2004 in Asia which predominantly (but not exclusively) involved smallholder flocks (e.g. cases in Siberia in 2005, cases in Thailand in the second half of 2004 – see page 8 of http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/subjects/documents/ai/AVIbull029a.pdf).
大型家禽養殖場是否導致了 H5N1 的傳播？當然，他們並沒有透過掩蓋一些疫情來幫助他們的事業，但他們並不是唯一這樣做的人。最後，供您參考，我在新聞文章發布當天閱讀了整個報導。在這樣的論壇中，毫無根據的評論提出其他建議並不是特別有幫助。
問候，
萊斯·西姆斯
親愛的馬丁/德夫林/理查德，
引用：中國、泰國、土耳其和越南的村莊在報告家禽病例之前就發生了人類感染病例，但後來發現，這些病例為小農/放養部門未報告提供了明顯的證據。人類不應該成為家禽感染的哨兵，但這種情況一再發生。在土耳其的案例中，美國報紙（《紐約時報》？）報道稱，卡車抵達兒童死亡的城鎮，車上載著來自附近一家工廠的舊肉雞，這些肉雞被低價出售。這不是任何證據，但卻是人們在後院羊群之前被感染的一種可能的方式。
引用：在我目前工作的越南（順便說一句，正在研究如何保護數以百萬計飼養食腐家禽的家庭的生計），畜牧業生產部估計，雞總數中約有 20%（接近 4000 萬隻家禽） ）是半集約商業雞群，包含100 至300 隻家禽。這些雞群不屬於綜合運營的一部分，而且由於其生產系統和行銷方法，它們是最容易感染 H5N1 禽流感的雞群。需要找到保護這些家禽的方法，一些基本的生物安全（和疫苗接種）有助於做到這一點。這些是我在帖子中提到的農場，而不是為綜合公司工作的承包商擁有的雞群，這些雞群通常規模較大，並實行合理的生物安全措施。我確信德夫林可以在這裡提供幫助：我的理解是（至少有一些）合約農場使用大型工廠化農場提供的雛雞？
引用：任何讀過 Grain 文章的人都會得出這樣的結論：致命的 H5N1 禽流感菌株本質上是工業家禽養殖的問題。其震央是中國和東南亞的工廠化農場。然而這種說法與H5N1病毒在亞洲出現的方式（透過鵝和活禽市場）並不相符，見下文拉薩。那個市場是「濕」市場嗎？
引用：由於缺乏關於歐亞大陸傳播確切模式的可靠數據，但有一個完全合理且明顯的解釋：傳播模式是沿著公路和鐵路線從東向西傳播。禽流感以前曾沿著鐵路線傳播：例如 1925 年在美國。髒兮兮的搬運板條箱顯然是當時的傳播媒介。整個歐亞大陸的傳播並不遵循任何鳥類遷徙路徑，也沒有任何物種在春季從東部開始遷徙，在秋季最終到達西部。遷移是一種前後運動：如果疾病在春天向北移動，那麼它就會在秋天返回南方。
引用：大約自 2000 年以來，自由放養的家鴨在 H5N1 病毒的維持和傳播中發揮了關鍵作用，但很奇怪的是，這種疾病並沒有從家養放養鴨傳染給野生、候鳥（例如，過去十年米埔的健康野生鳥類中完全沒有這種病毒）。現在亞洲的野鳥族群不應該被這種疾病淹沒嗎？
引用：亞洲自 2004 年底以來發生的病例主要（但不完全）涉及小農群體（例如 2005 年西伯利亞的病例，2004 年下半年泰國的病例 – 參見 AVIbull029a.pdf 第 8 頁）。同樣，對此有一個完全合理的解釋。聯合國糧農組織的一份公報稱，2004 年西藏拉薩爆發的疫情可追溯到 1,500 公里外的中國蘭州。疫情發生在拉薩的主要家禽市場。假設這些鳥提前一兩天就賣給了小農戶呢？結果：西藏各地的後院農場幾乎同時突然爆發疫情——這正是烏克蘭等地報道的模式。罪魁禍首又指向哪裡呢？當然是野生鳥類。那麼蘭州在哪裡呢？絲綢之路上的“樞紐”，位於從中國到東歐的主要鐵路線上。
引用：大型家禽養殖場是否導致了 H5N1 的傳播？當然，他們並沒有透過掩蓋一些疫情來幫助他們的事業，但他們並不是唯一這樣做的人。因此，我確信，當人們普遍認為野生鳥類是病毒的唯一傳播者時，您可以理解我們的沮喪。當然，他們可能會扮演一定的角色，但最多只是一個非常小的角色。
引用：最後，供您參考，我在新聞文章發布當天閱讀了整個報導。在這樣的論壇中，毫無根據的評論提出其他建議並不是特別有幫助。同意。
問候
理查
來自 Grain 的 Devlin Kuyek：
親愛的馬丁，
我很抱歉倉促地得出西姆斯博士沒有閱讀該報告的結論。也許我受到了圍繞這個問題的所有猜測的影響（或者可能是他提到了勞裡·加勒特）。我想簡要回應他最新貼文中的幾點，同時鼓勵論壇上比我更有知識的其他人回覆我遺漏的那些觀點。
令人欽佩的是，西姆斯博士將注意力集中在小農身上。我們也相信，他們面臨禽流感持續爆發的最大風險，不僅來自病毒，還來自對他們來說不切實際的控制措施和「重組」計劃，這些措施將把他們從畫面中消滅。我們也相信，根據我們與世界各地農民密切合作的經驗，農民對如何控制農場疾病（無論是農作物還是動物）擁有豐富的知識，而這些知識常常被農民視為「原始」。外部專家。正如西姆斯博士在評論中提到的那樣，生物安全需要對小型混合農場和工廠化農場採取不同的方法。如果我錯了，他可以糾正我，但控制新城疫等傳統方法對於小農戶和大型企業來說是完全不同的。
在小型農場中，新城疫被視為一種經常發生但僅造成輕微死亡的低度疾病。但在工廠化農場中，它可以透過生物安全的一個小漏洞進入，進化成毒性更強的菌株，迅速消滅大部分（如果不是全部）雞群，然後傳播到其他工廠化農場和小農農場，在那裡它現在更加致命。這就是為什麼每當工廠化農場爆發疫情時就會進行大規模撲殺（就像平常一樣）。
一般來說，小型農場的生物安全著重於平衡和適應當地生態系統（僅在某些情況下需要外部幹預—疫苗等）。目標是控制疾病——當疾病流行時，這種方法當然有意義，就像現在的禽流感一樣。這對工廠化農場來說是不可能的，這就是為什麼它必須完全封閉，並且必須採取如此嚴格的生物安全措施——這些措施在某些時候不可避免地會被破壞。從我們對禽流感和其他家禽病毒的研究中可以看出，小型農場生物安全的核心要素是保護它們免受家禽業的侵害。
正如我們在報告中指出的，寮國案例中最有趣的一點是，高致病性 H5N1 僅限於商業部門，小農部門和工業化農場部門（市場等）之間幾乎沒有聯繫。 ）。換句話說，寮國的小農場似乎受到了 H5N1 病毒的保護，因為它們受到了家禽業的保護，儘管來自泰國和中國的非法家禽進口令人擔憂。 （寮國的獸醫與家禽養殖場的比例也是該地區最低的，而本地雞的比例卻最高，這應該引起人們的思考。）
正如我們在報告中指出的那樣，聯合國糧農組織和世界動物衛生組織 (OIE) 報告稱，“越來越多的證據表明，病毒在小規模和散養家禽中的生存依賴於補充。”但這些頂級機構的這一令人難以置信的聲明幾乎沒有受到任何關注！幾乎沒有人考慮家禽生物多樣性之間的關係，儘管同一機構報告鄉村雞對 H5N1 表現出抵抗力。
在我們看來，控制病毒的關鍵是防止其失控。我們從研究中得到的認識是，這種疾病在工廠化農場中失去了控制。正如西姆斯博士所懷疑的那樣，現在在地球上肆虐的 H5N1 病毒株的出現可能與鵝和自由放養的鴨子有關。
但我們的觀點是，這個問題只是因為工廠化養殖和跨國禽業而爆發。只要看看尼日利亞和印度最近爆發的疫情就知道了。或者看看俄羅斯南部爆發的大規模疫情，頂級獸醫推測，一些工廠化農場有 50 萬隻雞死亡，因為一些野鳥進入了飼料製備設施。這就是為什麼我們說家禽業是禽流感危機的中心。
當我向聯合國糧農組織首席獸醫約瑟夫·多梅內克詢問老撾的情況時，他說，正是該國家禽密度低以及缺乏主要市場才避免了疫情的爆發。小規模、生物多樣性、混合農業和當地市場是否可以解決禽流感問題？難道這就是越南、泰國等國家要求的所謂重組？
享受討論…
德夫林
Just come across a site founded in wake of UK’s foot and mouth epidemic in 2001; "providing a daily commentary on matters having a connection with animal health or welfare or legislation from the perspective of an independent onlooker." Has news page devoted to H5N1, esp re wild birds, biosecurity, and vaccination. UK focus, but info culled from many sources. Warmwell.com or, direct to Avian influenza
Two letters from UK virologist Dr Ruth Watkins of interest (as perhaps not elsewhere); suggesting vaccination for poultry in Turkey. (In letter posted on this forum, vet Les Sims has written of vaccination being important in Hong Kong’s success in controlling H5N1: Learning to live with H5N1 In second letter, Watkins makes ominous prediction should things go awry in Turkey:
引用：It would seem that Turkey’s exit strategy could be to eliminate the keeping of domestic poultry altogether- I have seen this on the latest ProMed bulletin. This may be very unfortunate for the nutrition and health of its poorer population who- if they ever get the meagre monetary compensation proposed- may be hard pushed to find it would cover another long term source of nutrition as valuable as poultry. They may become like the Maltese and attempt to catch and kill every migrating bird that passes through Turkey- a disaster for wild birds.Excerpt from a “machine translation” of an essay published in Germany:
引用：It is similarly wrong and by nothing proven to assume that a swan infected
with bird flu could briefly feel the need before its end still to
land on a chicken yard how it is most improbable that migratory birds
empty themselves just over the yard and infect the unsolicited
chickens. For such procedures each concrete reference is missing,
even if Virologen in laboratory tests prove the infection ability of
bird excrement free of doubts.– quite right!!
Neue Pest, alte Angst – Essay [New plague, old fear – essay]
by Josef H. ReichholfPost edited by: martin, at: 2006/03/08 03:53
各位，
It was asked what proof there was for Dr Sim’s statements regarding reporting of infection in small flocks, and in general with the role of intensive farming in the spread of bird flu.
Well, there is a paper published in 2004 describing H5N1 epidemiology in Thailand. I have not re-read the paper for this post, but if I remember clearly, the authors found higher levels of infection in smaller flock sizes, the opposite of what I would have expected. There is also some discussion of the reporting of disease by different sized operations.
The reference is:
Tiensin T., et al. (2004). Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1, Thailand, 2004. Emerging Infectious diseases 11(11): 1664-1672.
and can be found at: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol11no11/05-0608.htm
Best Wishes,
Gavin.[url=http://www.lapresse.ch/vqhome/le_journal/economie/usine_poulet_130306.edition=nv
.html]The H5N1 will support the chicken factories[/url]
[“機器翻譯”]引用：INTERVIEW Switzerland Samuel Jutzi is l’un directors of
l’Organisation of the United Nations for l’alimentation and
l’agriculture (FAO). It analyzes the consequences of the influenza
aviaire for the poultry producers and the consumers.To the head office of FAO, to Rome, Samuel Jutzi, directs division
livestock health and production. A station which places it in first
line in the battle against virus H5N1 that FAO carries out on the
ground, mainly in the countries deprived of effective veterinary
services.– Why the trade play does such a role in the propagation of the
influenza aviaire?– Quite simply because the avicolous sector became a sector
globalized par excellence! Since a score of years, in the whole
world, he knows a spectacular growth and incredibly industrialized
himself. The weight of the exchanges does not cease increasing. For
this reason the poultry trade explains in good part the expansion of
the disease, in spite of strict medical rules on a world level.– And its origin? Does the mass production offer a ground favorable
to the virus?– Not. It is necessary to distinguish between the density of
poultries in an area and the number of poultries in the industrial
companies. These last can be protected effectively from the viruses.
Actually applied, the safety requirements of these complexes offer a
high degree of protection. For a virus, the best conditions of
development they are the family breedings with a strong density of
poultries.– A to hear you, the future they are the factories with poulets…
– There is D E any manner a tendency to industrialization encouraged
by the economy. In Europe, the near total of the production is done
already in an intensive way, the developing countries follow the same
evolution. Current epizooty still will accelerate the movement since
the poultries can be better protected in these protected artificial
environments. Other side of the coin: the races will be fewer and
that will lead to the standardization.– And farm chickens? They will be soon nothing any more but one good
memory?– Not, but this type of production will be very minority. The
poultries of great quality, high in the open air and nourished with
the grain will become products of niche. In Europe, one wants to
continue to produce them, but for that it is necessary to find the
means of protecting them from epizooties. It is one of the reasons
for which France tries out the vaccination targeted in certain areas.
Because it is known that after this influenza aviaire which is spread
on planet, there will be other epizooties. In a globalized world, it
is difficult to escape from it.引用：Vietnam’s poultry sector has been ravaged by bird flu, but a lull in infections has left producers divided on whether to slow down or forge ahead and revolutionise the industry. Some experts and corporate survivors of the disease that tore through backyard chicken farms here say now is the time to invest in modern integrated operations that promise more safety for workers and consumers.A shift from family chicken coups to cutting edge factory farms would make both public health and business sense, said Tony Forman, avian influenza technical adviser for the UN Food and Agriculture Organization in Vietnam. "Groups prepared to invest in biosecure facilities in breeding, animal feed, slaughter houses and food processing may achieve a high level of return on their investment," he told AFP. Since late 2003, Vietnam has been the ground zero of the bird flu crisis. Of the 97 known human deaths worldwide, 42 occurred in the communist country, leading to bans on poultry sales and the slaughter of tens of millions of birds. … But as the disease has spread to Europe and Africa this northern winter, a three-month lull in reported animal outbreaks in Vietnam and four months free of human cases here have raised cautious hopes that the worst may be over.
The guarded optimism comes after the sector took a heavy hit. Aside from the human cost, bird flu took a high toll on the businesses of farmers, butchers and retailers, both small and large. US food giant Cargill has closed a local chicken facility and slowed animal feed production. "We will reconsider getting back into that activity if the market gets better in future," said Truong Chanh, head of Cargill in Vietnam. Animal feed market leader Proconco — a Vietnamese subsidiary of the French group EMC that has actually turned a profit amid the crisis by shifting to feed for pigs and aquaculture — is now torn between doubt and optimism. "Sales started again in January," said Michel Boudrot, general manager of Proconco. "The next months should not be so bad."
But at least one producer, Thai company Charoen Pokphand (CP), has voiced enthusiasm and insists that now is the time to invest heavily. The company, which says it already controls 80 percent of industrial poultry production in Vietnam, plans to double output to a million chicken per week by the end of the year. "CP will succeed in turning a crisis into an opportunity of development," says Sooksunt Jiumjaiswanglerg, president of CP Vietnam Livestock. "We anticipate 30 percent growth of turnover each year," said Sooksunt, adding that the company also plans to open more than 100 new CP Fresh Mart shops this year and 200 to 300 Five Star roast chicken stalls. "That is how high our level of confidence in the future is," he said. The Thai group is the principal supplier of the fast-food chains KFC and Lotteria here, as well as of supermarket chain BigC (Casino), whose poultry sales have actually climbed since last May. "The customers pay great attention to health safety", said Christophe Varvier, food purchasing manager for BigC. He said since the crisis Vietnamese customers "buy more and more chickens processed by industries, cut up and conditioned on their premises, because they are less likely to be contaminated during transport."
In the long term, CP wants to control the entire process, from egging to sales — a drastic shift in a country where birds now tend to be transported on motorbikes before being hand-slaughtered with a hachet on a wooden block. The government will eventually promote the industrialization of the sector, said Patrice Gautier, Vietnam coordinator of Veterinarians Without Borders, with real results likely "perhaps in five or 10 years". But the shift will come at a price, Gautier predicted. "It’s hard to tell what will become of the small breeders," he said. "Will they have to find an alternative way to make money?"
Does bird flu cloud have silver lining for Vietnam’s poultry sector?
More on the madness resulting in large part from bird flu fears (also, here, Newcastle Disease):
引用：Tom Silva’s chickens pump out 1.4 million eggs a day, but his operation looks more like a prison than a farm. To reach his hen houses, an intruder would have to scale eight-foot fences topped by razor wire, then sneak past surveillance cameras. "Biosecurity" is the buzzword du jour at chicken, turkey and egg operations across the country. A bird flu pandemic sweeping through flocks in Southeast Asia and beyond has spurred American commercial farmers to tighten their defenses. "This is certainly the biggest issue facing the industry today, no question about that," said Richard Lobb, spokesman for the National Chicken Council. The stakes are especially high in California, where a $2.5 billion poultry industry ranks among the top 10 producers nationwide for dinner chicken, turkey and table egg output. State officials say migratory bird routes that stretch southward from the Bering Strait and down the West Coast could bring the disease by this summer.A tradition of raising "backyard chickens" for eggs, meat, cockfighting and bird shows runs deep in some Asian and Hispanic subcultures here in the Central Valley. Industry executives and state officials say these backyard birds number in the millions, and they worry these birds out in the open could be exposed to sick migrating flocks. Then they could pass the disease to their owners – many of whom work at commercial poultry operations. And there is painful precedent here. An outbreak of Exotic Newcastle disease killed more than 3.1 million birds, mostly poultry, in Southern California in 2002 and 2003. Silva, vice president of the valley’s J.S. West Milling Co., is as concerned about human carriers walking into his four facilities as he is about keeping sick birds out. "If it gets into our industry, the only way to get it out is to euthanize complete complexes like this," he said during a tour of an egg-laying operation whose 1.5 million hens alone he valued at nearly $10 million.
The tour was brief, because no outsiders are allowed beyond the "STOP: BIOSECURE AREA" sign and razor wire – not even the lab workers who collect blood samples once a month for disease testing. They too are on Silva’s payroll. Even the short tour provided striking evidence of the measures the poultry industry is taking to combat bird flu before it reaches America. Today, all trucks entering and exiting Silva’s complex get an automated bath of ammonia-based disinfectant. Incoming drivers are asked where they’ve been and whether they’ve been exposed to poultry. Every employee enters the site through a "dirty door" into a trailer that serves as a changing room. They swap their street clothes for pre-washed boots, hats and coveralls, then enter the hen houses through a "clean door." They reverse the process on the way out. Various poultry companies even try to avoid each other on the road. They plot routes and stagger deliveries throughout the day, on the premise that the virus might jump from truck to truck. …
Foster Farms is taking a different approach with its "broiler"-raising farms. One of its facilities, the 120-acre Gurr Ranch, is not ringed by razor wire or even fencing. The hen houses are padlocked, and outsiders are not welcome, but the real emphasis is on making the ranch as repulsive as possible to migrating birds. The resulting landscape looks like a moon base, intentionally devoid of trees and ponds but colonized by 64 identical outbuildings that house nearly 1.3 million chickens.
Migrating birds are looking for food, water and shelter, said Charles Corsiglia, an avian veterinarian on the staff of Livingston, Calif.-based Foster Farms, the biggest poultry company in the West. "If we make our farms so that they don’t have those things as they’re flying over, they say, ‘You know, that looks like a really bad place to land, because there’s nowhere for me to waddle around,’" Corsiglia said. "’So I’m going to land at the dairy, or the canal.’" Like the J.S. West Milling facility, the farm buildings are meant to be impenetrable by outside birds, though swallows flitted in and out of the eaves one recent morning. Corsiglia said these visitors can’t get into the hen houses. Every person must don disposable plastic boots before setting foot on the Gurr Ranch property. And truckers delivering feed are required to hose their rigs off with the same ammonia-based disinfectant used at J.S. West Milling. It’s all part of Corsiglia’s three-part formula for biosecurity: isolating birds from disease, controlling people and equipment who come and go, and sanitizing everything. "Animals that aren’t exposed to disease don’t get sick from those diseases," Corsiglia said. "The logic is so simple, it’s laughable." Exotic Newcastle hurt the industry, but forced it and the government to refine surveillance and response procedures, Corsiglia said.
U.S. Department of Agriculture officials believe farm workers who kept cockfighting roosters at home brought the disease to the egg farms where they worked. A quarantine on pet birds and commercial fowl in a 46,000-square-mile area spanning from Santa Barbara to San Diego cost federal and state agencies more than $151 million but kept the disease contained to Southern California. "That was kind of like a dry run," Corsiglia said. "We never had it up here (in Northern California), which was actually very good because it showed the system really works." Exotic Newcastle lingered for years in California during an outbreak in the 1970s, but the 2002-2003 outbreak was eradicated in less than a year, said Steve Lyle, a spokesman for the California Department of Food and Agriculture. Silva keeps a brown foam chick in the center console of his truck. It’s made for squeezing – a stress-buster. He’s not squeezing yet. Silva has invested $250,000 since 2002 in biosecurity measures. But like many in the industry, he worries that a Chicken Little, sky-is-falling panic may be his business’ worst enemy. "It’s not in the United States. It’s not even close to the United States," he said of bird flu. Tens of thousands of Americans die each year from "regular" flu, Silva said. "And we’re worried about this bird flu?"
Biosecurity’ is buzzword vs. bird flu
Is this really what we (as people) want? Do you think the advertising for poultry products from such places show razor wire, padlocked houses in place like the moon; or chickens pecking around in green open space, with wild birds singing in the trees?
Foster Farms website says: "Foster Farms is absolutely committed to the humane treatment of all animals." – which would seem debatable if run a farm system that’s repulsive to migratory birds. Also, "Foster Farms poultry is always 100% natural with no added hormones or steroids." – again, what does "Natural" mean, when chickens live purely indoors, in controlled artificial environment, no chance of contact with any other wild birds?
I’ve posted first part of this to thread on evolutionary biology; but implications for farms n biosecurity, so adding here too:
Further evidence of evolutionary biology at work in poultry farms comes from UK’s H7N3 outbreak. (Not conclusive here, but fits evol biology – as ever with flu.)
引用：Birds on the free range unit, however, suffered only a mild form of the flu and none died from the infection….the virus was transported from the egg farm to the Banhams chicken farm, where it killed some 400 chickens and triggered a drop in egg production by other birds.
note also, from intensive farms:
引用：Blood samples from birds on their farm showed that they had been exposed to the H7N3 virus as long ago as four weeks.– during which, presumably, the virus evolved towards virulence in the “disease factories”
Original, low path virus thought to have been introduced to free-range flock, from wild birds.
Now this may be possible (a few routes mooted).
But, again, leads to serious questions re poultry farming, and conservation.
Do we really want farms that are hermetically sealed from outside world (and yes, that is really impossible, tho can have very tight security)? Ensure wild birds are kept away from poultry farms – like the US farm with not even a tree.Or do we aim for farming system that can detect bird flus; and have farming systems/measures to guard against introduced strains of flu evolving to virulence?
(Then, can biosecurity really work now, or is it too late; I’ve seen paper on poultry in China market, where had several strains of flu.)Gavin Smith wrote:
引用：各位，It was asked what proof there was for Dr Sim’s statements regarding reporting of infection in small flocks, and in general with the role of intensive farming in the spread of bird flu.
Well, there is a paper published in 2004 describing H5N1 epidemiology in Thailand. I have not re-read the paper for this post, but if I remember clearly, the authors found higher levels of infection in smaller flock sizes, the opposite of what I would have expected. There is also some discussion of the reporting of disease by different sized operations.
The reference is:
Tiensin T., et al. (2004). Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1, Thailand, 2004. Emerging Infectious diseases 11(11): 1664-1672.
and can be found at: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol11no11/05-0608.htm
Best Wishes,
Gavin.I did re-read the study. Yes, it does find more detected cases of infection in backyard flocks (83% of all cases). But this figure taken alone paints a distorted picture given the much greater number of backyard flocks in the country than commercial flocks. It also doesn’t provide a comparison of the number of infected birds per flock size (given that the backyard flocks are minute in comparison with the factory farms and that mortality rates within backyard farms are generally much lower).
Most importantly, the study found that the proportion of factory farms infected were five times higher than for backyard farms.
-Devlin
Article from Institute of Science in Society (UK), looking at wild birds wrongly blamed for h5n1 spread; also re farming – should be closing factory farms, not small farms.
Fowl Play in Bird FluAfter news from Romania suggesting itinerant sellers involved in spread of H5N1, this note from Richard Thomas of Birdlife International: "The buyers could be the main source of spreading the disease. We saw that they went from one farm that had suspected avian flu to another farm and within three days it broke out there," says Centre Director Dr Isep Sulaiman. "Then, the buyer sold the infected live chickens at market, people took them home and didn’t kill them immediately and it spread even further." Taken from the FAO’s: Enemy at the gate: saving farms and people from bird flu (April 2005)
引用：According to experts, wild birds are spreading the deadly H5N1 virus that’s wiping out poultry worldwide. But are they really to blame? Or is the disease not only a direct result of intensive farming – but actually being spread by the industry? Joanna Blythman reports Wednesday June 7, 2006 The Guardian If you normally make a point of buying free-range poultry and eggs, then you may be wondering if this is any longer a wise decision. The television reportage of bird flu, with its shots of men wearing white suits and masks chasing chickens in poor, rural Asian or African villages, or footage of chickens being slaughtered in third world markets while sinister-looking, positively Hitchcockian wild birds circle overhead, has helped build the perception that H5N1 is a disease of wild birds and domesticated poultry kept outdoors in primitive – and, by implication, dodgy – circumstances. On the home front, the nation is on amber alert.All the major summer agricultural shows have decided to abandon their customary displays of live poultry. The fear is that H5N1 is winging its way to Britain, and that if we don’t get every last chicken, hen and budgie indoors, then it could mutate into a human flu pandemic and any minute we’ll be dead. A stream of statements and strategy documents from august bodies such as the World Health Organisation reinforce the "wild birds and backyard poultry are the problem" plot-line. This must come as music to the ears of the intensive poultry producers, who heartily resent the good press that organic and free-range poultry generally receive. For once it is free-range birds that everyone is worried about, not the caged laying hens and tightly packed broiler birds that generally feature in food exposes. But what if those august bodies have got it wrong? Multiple cracks are beginning to show in the supposed scientific consensus on the origins of avian flu.
A growing number of non-governmental organisations, bird experts and independent vets are pointing the finger at the global intensive poultry industry. A new report from Grain, an international environmental organisation, challenges the official line. "H5N1 is essentially a problem of industrial poultry practices," it says. "Its epicentre is the factory farms of China and south-east Asia. Although wild birds can carry the disease, at least for short distances, [the main infection] route is the highly self-regulated transnational poultry industry, which sends its products and wastes around the world through a multitude of channels." Grain’s alternative theory for the emergence of H5N1 – which got backing in an editorial in the Lancet medical journal last month – starts with the observation that bird flu has coexisted pretty peacefully with wild birds, small-scale poultry farming and live markets for centuries without evolving into a more dangerous form of the disease. An explanation for this is that outdoor poultry flocks tend to be low-density, localised, and offer plenty of genetic diversity in breeding stock.
By contrast, the hi-tech, intensive poultry farm, where as many as 40,000 birds can be kept in one shed and reared entirely indoors without ever seeing the light of day, is just like an overcrowded nursery of wheezy toddlers when the latest winter bug comes knocking – an ideal environment for spreading the disease and for encouraging the rapid mutation of a mild virus into a more pathogenic and highly transmissible strain, such as H5N1.
"What we are saying is that H5N1 is a poultry virus killing wild birds, not the other way around," says Devlin Kuyek, from Grain. The organisation’s view is supported by the charity BirdLife International, which plots the migratory routes of wild birds. "With few exceptions, there is a limited correlation between the pattern and timing of spread among domestic birds and wild bird migrations," it says. It points out that most of the bird flu outbreaks in south-east Asian countries can be linked to the movements of poultry and poultry products. Looking at the outbreaks in Nigeria and Egypt, which occurred almost simultaneously in multiple large-scale poultry operations, it says that there is "strong circumstantial evidence" that it was the transfer of infected material – straw, soil on vehicles, clothes or shoes – from one factory unit to another that spread H5N1 there, not wild birds. … Intense debate has built up over one particular mass outbreak last year among geese at Qinghai lake in northern China.
The widely accepted official explanation is that migratory birds carried the virus westwards from there to Russia and Turkey. But according to BirdLife International’s Dr Richard Thomas, no species migrates from Qinghai west to eastern Europe. "The pattern of outbreaks follows major road and rail routes, not flyways," he says. What Qinghai lake does have, however, is many surrounding intensive poultry farms whose "poultry manure", a euphemism for what is scraped off the floor of factory farms – bird faeces, feathers and soiled litter – is used as feed and fertiliser in fish farms and fields around Qinghai.
According to WHO, bird flu can survive in bird faeces for up to 35 days. Might it be that at Qinghai, H5N1 was passed from intensively reared birds to wild ones via chicken faeces, and not the other way around? … When H5N1 turned up in a remote village in eastern Turkey in January, this was initially blamed on migratory birds. Then when villagers gave their side of the story, it emerged that their diseased birds were intimately connected with a large factory farm nearby.
The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has now acknowledged that the poultry trade spread H5N1 in Turkey, singling out the common practice of intensive poultry farms sending out huge truckloads of low-value (possibly ailing) birds to poor farmers. Yet when bird flu hit a factory farm in Nigeria in February, the FAO spokesman still insisted: "If it’s not wild birds [that are the cause], it will be difficult to understand."
The Nigerian authorities, on the other hand, blamed the poultry industry. It subsequently emerged that the hatching eggs used by the farm in question were not from registered hatcheries, and may have come from a bird flu-infected country, such as Turkey. Worldwide, intensive poultry production has exploded and this growth seems to be mirrored by an increase in avian flu. … Joanna Blythman’s new book, Bad Food Britain – How A Nation Ruined Its Appetite, is published by Fourth Estate, price £7.99.
From FAO website; not sure this info will be trumpeted by chief vet Joseph Domenech, who seems a big proponent of big poultry farming (and ready blamer of wild birds for much to do with H5N1).
引用：There is an assumption that because the majority of HPAI outbreaks have been reported in smallholder backyard flocks, these operations are inherently more risky than other types of poultry operations. This assumption was tested using published data from the 2004 HPAI epidemic and concurrent active surveillance programme in Thailand. … Estimation of the crude risk of HPAI infection in 2004 by flock type as defined by the Thai animal health authorities, showed that, for example, although layer flocks only constituted one percent of all flocks, they accounted for five percent of all registered infected flocks. Quail flocks showed the highest risk of detected HPAI infection, nearly reaching 1.6 percent. Against widely held expectations, backyard flocks showed the lowest risk of detected HPAI infection, 0.05 percent, only one quarter that of layer and broiler flocks. … it appears warranted to review the ‘bio-security’ of commercial operations. … Campylobacter spp, for example, similar to HPAI virus, move among avian host species, both domesticated and wild and in both directions. The inability of conventional bio-security measures to prevent the movement of Campylobacter in and out of modern broiler facilities was clearly demonstrated in a recent study of Campylobacter-free broiler flocks in the USA, housed in sanitized facilities, using standard bio-security measures, and fed Campylobacter-free feed and water. … The above example provides ample evidence for the potential of pathogens to move in and out of standard, reputedly bio-secure, commercial poultry facilities, even in developed settings. … Given the much stronger political influence of commercial interests vis-à-vis smallholder producers there is a clear danger that regulators will opt for ‘easy’ solutions, such as imposing measures to make subsistence poultry production ‘safer’, eg forced housing or confinement of poultry. …HPAI Risk, Bio-Security and Smallholder Adversity
Worldwatch Institute isn’t a pioneer in saying that avian flu is a by-product of intensive meat production, tho is novel in saying (at same time) that another by-product is contribution to global warming. Should help with slop progress towards truth emerging, tho the myth of wild birds as ready vectors of H5N1 remains potent.
引用：The growth of factory farms, their proximity to congested cities in the developing world, and the globalized poultry trade are all culprits behind the spread of avian flu, while livestock wastes damage the climate at a rate that surpasses emissions from cars and SUVs. These preliminary findings on avian flu and meat production, from the upcoming Worldwatch Institute report Vital Signs 2007–2008, were released today by research associate Danielle Nierenberg at the annual conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in San Francisco.At least 15 nations have restricted or banned free-range and backyard production of birds in an attempt to deal with avian flu on the ground, a move that may ultimately do more harm than good, according to Nierenberg. “Many of the world’s estimated 800 million urban farmers, who raise crops and animals for food, transportation, and income in back yards and on rooftops, have been targeted unfairly by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization,” she told participants at the AAAS event. “The socioeconomic importance of livestock to the world’s poor cannot be overstated.”
In 2006, global meat production increased 2.5 percent to an estimated 276 million tons. Sixty percent of this production occurred in the developing world, where half of all meat is now consumed thanks to rising incomes and exploding urbanization.
Rising demand for meat has helped drive livestock production away from rural, mixed-farming systems, where farmers raise a few different species on a grass diet, toward intensive periurban and urban production of pigs and chickens. Because of unregulated zoning and subsidies that encourage livestock production, chicken and pig “confined animal feedlot operations” (CAFOs), or factory farms, are moving closer to major urban areas in China, Bangladesh, India, and many countries in Africa.
Locating large chicken farms near cities might make economic sense, but the close concentration of the birds to densely populated areas can help foster and spread disease, Nierenberg says. In Laos, 42 of the 45 outbreaks of avian flu in the spring of 2004 occurred on factory farms, and 38 were in the capital, Vientiane (the few small farms in the city where outbreaks occurred were located close to commercial operations). In Nigeria, the first cases of avian flu were found in an industrial broiler operation; it spread from that 46,000-bird farm to 30 other factory farms, then quickly to neighboring backyard flocks, forcing already-poor farmers to kill their chickens.
Due mainly to the spread of avian flu and the culling of birds, global poultry output rose only slightly in 2006 to approximately 83 million tons, roughly a 1-percent decrease from the preceding year. Pig meat production, however, grew by 3 percent to 108 million tons, an increase likely due to shifting consumption in Asia from chicken to pork due to concerns about avian flu.
Avian flu has existed among backyard flocks for centuries, but has never been found to evolve there into highly pathogenic forms such as the deadly H5N1 virus. In CAFOs, in contrast, where animals are concentrated by the thousands, diseases erupt and spread quickly. Trade in poultry from these operations is a culprit in spreading the disease to smallholder farmers.
Experts suggest that rather than culling smaller, backyard flocks, the FAO, WHO, and other international agencies should focus the bulk of their avian flu prevention efforts on large poultry producers and on stopping disease outbreaks before they occur. The industrial food system not only threatens the livelihoods of small farmers, it potentially puts the world at risk for a potential flu pandemic. “While H5N1…may have been a product of the world’s factory farms, it’s small producers who have the most to lose,” says Nierenberg.
Intensive animal farming is not only deleterious to human health and economies; it is also responsible for a great deal of ecological destruction. The growing numbers of livestock are responsible for 18 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions (as measured in carbon dioxide equivalent). They account for 37 percent of emissions of methane, which has more than 20 times the global warming potential of carbon dioxide, and 65 percent of emissions of nitrous oxide, another powerful greenhouse gas, most of which comes from manure.
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