是時候把農業放在碼頭上重新傳播h5n1了

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  • #3266
    馬丁
    參與者

      Enough already of the wild birds witchhunt! When even experts are reduced to looking for an “avian version of the Stealth Bomber”, it’s clear there should be more focus on another potential culprit for harbouring and spreading H5N1. Farming, for instance.

      Suppose we could interrogate farming, what might we ask. Let me count the questions. (Others may think of more.)

      Six main questions here:

      1) Why does the poultry industry continue to spawn highly pathogenic avian influenzas?
      2) What role might poultry vaccines play in sustaining and spreading H5N1?
      3) What roles might transport of poultry and other captive birds, and poultry equipment, play in spreading H5N1?
      4) Does chicken manure – especially chicken manure used in fishponds – play a role in spreading H5N1 beyond poultry farms?
      5) Do officials tend to play down or not report H5N1 outbreaks resulting from poultry industry, but readily blame wild birds?
      6) Is there an FAO report into the role of farming in the recent spread of H5N1; and if not, why not?

      1) We’ve known for years that poultry farming can spawn highly pathogenic avian influenzas. Strains that are of little or no consequence in wild birds can evolve to become highly lethal to poultry, and to other species – rarely including humans.

      Why, then, do we continue to see such virulent strains evolving in poultry farms; why aren’t we seeing efforts to transform poultry farming techniques? (Seems it’s too late to guard against wild viruses entering poultry)

      2) Until H5N1, eradication of infected flocks has been the main means of eradicating HPAI; but with H5N1, poultry vaccines are being widely used. What roles – if any – are poultry vaccines playing in sustaining and spreading the nasty H5N1 variant (genotype Z and near allies)?

      Even with good vaccines, infected poultry can retain H5N1, but at levels below those needed for transmission (presentation by Robert Webster). With substandard vaccines, poultry may not show symptoms, but may harbour H5N1 at transmissible levels, thus promoting spread in live markets.

      To what extent has the use of vaccines enabled the “Z” H5N1 to survive for nearly a decade – perhaps mostly as a “silent epidemic” (New Scientist)? Does H5N1 survive like a peat fire – mostly almost unseen, but flaring up when into susceptible populations, whether unvaccinated poultry or wild birds?

      Where are vaccines used, both iegally and ilegally [eg poultry vaccines have been smuggled into Thailand]; and to what extent are substandard vaccines used?
      [In China, vaccination reportedly cheaper than using antibiotics, so surely tempting for at least large-scale farmers elsewhere]

      Correct use of poultry vaccines should include deployment of sentinel birds – non-vaccinated poultry, in case H5N1 is indeed present (and even spreading). Are these indeed always used in conjunction with vaccines – or are there “accidental sentinels” – non-vaccinated poultry, wild birds.

      3) Previous studies have shown that avian influenzas can be readily transported within the poultry industry (an FAO document suggested that once bird flu enters poultry, the mode of transportation shifts “from the flyways to the highways and byways”) What movements of poultry (and captive birds that may be directly or indirectly infected by poultry) may be involved in spread of H5N1?

      What is known of legal movements: how extensive, what are the key routes?

      What of illegal poultry/captive bird movements? With Italy recently seizing a consignment of smuggled Chinese poultry including 36,000 duck eggs, these may be extensive. How easy is it to take, say, eggs across international borders?

      What, too, of special cases such as fighting cocks, implicated as partial culprits of h5n1 bird flu spread in Thailand?
      To what extent are vaccinated poultry (including those given substandard vaccines) traded in markets, moved along legal and illegal trade routes?

      As well as eggs and birds, even poultry equipment such as crates contaminanted with droppings can spread avian flu. How extensively are these moved?

      4) Is there a link between use of chicken manure, including in aquaculture, and spread of h5n1 beyond poultry farms?

      How widely used is chicken manure as fertilizer/feed for aquaculture? After recent news report told of chicken manure being dumped by the truckload in a lake in Vietnam (at least 100 tonnes of chicken excrement a day), to increase fish production, cursory enquiries revealed it is also used in Yugoslavia,

      Might H5N1 infected chicken manure be the cause of the deaths of mute swans in Croatia, and perhaps Romania?
      In Croatia, swans that were evidently healthy during a prior stopove in Hungary died after landing on fishponds.
      In Romania, a BBC news report included, “like the fish farm behind Maliuc, where 86 dead swans have been found in the last week alone.”

      5) Is there a strong tendency for local and even national officials to play down or even fail to report outbreaks in and resulting from poultry farms – but a willingness to quickly blame wild birds (with or without any actual evidence)?
      If so, does this significantly distort the picture regarding the true major culprit for sustaining and spreading H5N1 (genotype Z)?

      6) FAO has produced a report into the apparent role of wild birds in the spread of H5N1. Why – to my knowledge – is there no equivalent FAO report on the role of farming?

      Post edited by: martin, at: 2005/11/12 03:09

      #3897
      匏名

        Martin,

        Try the following document for answers to a number of your questions.

        http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/subjects/en/health/diseases-cards/27septrecomm.pdf

        This FAO document clearly states that the main risk arises from domestic poultry with special emphasis on poorly managed live bird markets that can act as “reservoirs” of infection, non-biosecure poultry farming (i.e. smallholder and village poultry in much of Aisa) and domestic ducks that can be infecte,d not show signs of disease and excrete virus for a week or two.

        The situation remains that most of the spread of H5N1 HPAI has been associated with the poultry industry especially in places where the virus is endemic.

        Wild birds have almost certainly been involved in some of the long distance spread of virus recently (genetic evidence supports this as well), but that once established in a region, spread via poultry or items used with poultry will occur. Iif the disease is not rapidly controlled this becomes the main route of transmission.

        You are right to point out that vaccination should be accompanied by appropriate surveillance. However it is also important to recognise that vaccination was used as a response to endemic infection – it was not the initial cause. Vaccination was used in China, Viet Nam and Indonesia only after it was apparent that the disease was out of control and widespread – and the methods that work when a disease is identified early and in a small area, such as depopulation, were no longer feasible.

        To eliminate the disease in places such as Viet Nam it is likely that virtually all of the small holder and live poultry marketing sector would have to be shut down for a considerable period of time, which would affect the livelihood of some 13 million poor households and many others involved in this trade. Vaccination is being used to reduce the levels of virus excretion as a prelude to implementation of changes to the way that poultry are raised.

        Put simply, the disease cannot be eradicated from Asia unless or until there are major changes in the way that poultry are reared (or the virus changes to something more benign). The socio-economic implications of this are enormous and vaccination will be required as one of the control measures for some time.

        I can assure you that without vaccination the situation in Asia would be much worse than it is today.

        萊斯·西姆斯

        #3898
        馬丁
        參與者

          嗨萊斯:

          感謝您的另一篇知情貼文。

          還沒時間閱讀糧農組織的文件(我注意到有 60 多頁!)。

          我原以為中國在聯合國糧農組織真正批准使用之前就使用了 H5N1 疫苗,而聯合國糧農組織一直對家禽流感疫苗持懷疑態度(廣義上,僅限緊急使用)。
          “目前 H5N1 的強毒株出現在中國接種疫苗的家禽中。”新科學家說
          http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7338

          現在,中國家禽業似乎陷入了緊急狀態。

          引用:
          中國農業部週一在北京表示,目前中國每天生產禽流感疫苗1億多劑,可滿足重點地區疫情防治的需求。

          衛生部網站消息稱,衛生部加強禽流感疫苗研發、生產和品質監管,以保障供應。

          衛生部也加強了對仿冒疫苗的打擊力度,發放防偽標籤820萬張。

          http://english.people.com.cn/200511/15/eng20051115_221239.html

          能夠在接種疫苗的家禽中茁壯成長的病毒株是否也可能進化成高毒力,使 H5N1 的問題更加複雜?

          當中國可能存在假疫苗和其他劣質疫苗的問題時,並不總是需要一種能夠在良好疫苗的幫助下茁壯成長的病毒株。 11 月 12 日,《南華早報》刊登了一則新聞:

          引用:
          販毒人員無照走私毒品
          疫苗仍在測試並在市場上出售被指責
          遼寧省爆發禽流感疫情。

          稱黑山縣不少農民使用了該公司生產的疫苗
          內蒙古金谷集團,這幾乎沒有提供任何保護
          致命的疾病。該疫苗的目的是用於測試,但不是
          應該出售。

          在《自然》評論中,羅伯特·韋伯斯特和黛安·赫爾斯主張使用良好的家禽疫苗和哨兵鳥類。但使用疫苗並不簡單,部分原因是疫苗不合格:

          引用:
          對不同供應商的農業疫苗進行的少量比較試驗表明,有些是好的,有些是不好的。不好的疫苗只能預防疾病症狀,但不能預防病毒排泄,這可能會導致以後的感染。反對使用農業疫苗的眾多論點之一是,它們促進了循環病毒突變的選擇,使原始物種或其他物種的感染風險永久化。

          從源頭控制禽流感

          與中國一樣,印尼也採用了家禽疫苗,但:
          印尼稱部分家禽疫苗低於標準

          越南在禽流感疫苗接種問題上態度大轉變 是《新科學家》五月的新聞報道,內容是越南即將開始大規模測試家禽流感疫苗。

          本文指出,泰國僅允許鬥雞、自由放養的鴨子和雞接種疫苗。然而,我看到有關家禽疫苗走私到泰國的報導:
          泰國查獲200萬劑走私禽流感疫苗 (2004年2月26日報道)

          所以,現在看來,如果你接種疫苗,你就該死,如果你不接種疫苗,你就該死。

          如今的家禽養殖場顯然是「疾病工廠」(科普作家溫蒂·奧倫特稱之為「疾病工廠」)——保羅·埃瓦爾德的進化生物學理論預測,流感病毒將進化出劇毒株(並且可以持續存在,而病得很重的禽類很容易傳播疾病),看來令人討厭的 H5N1 變種將繼續留在我們身邊。
          停止疫苗接種,再加上全面有效的撲殺(是的,這在越南失敗了,所以幾乎沒有希望)可能會證明是一個短暫的、極其劇烈的衝擊,可以根除它——就像97 年的香港一樣,但規模很大。

          否則,需要對家禽養殖進行根本性改造-讓病重的家禽不再輕易傳播 H5N1 和其他烈性流感。更像是野外環境,死鴨子飛不起來。

          這是一個令人震驚的想法,現在人們迷上了明顯便宜的雞肉。
          然而彼得辛格教授指出,我們正在看到養雞場的一些真實成本,
          「工廠化農業」是不自然、不可持續且危險的

          貼文編輯:martin,發佈於:2005/12/11 00:55

          #3899
          匏名

            Martin,

            I should have added in my previous post that the use of substandard vaccine is to be deplored and that one of the reasons for doing post-vaccination surveillance is to ensure that the vaccine being used is stimulating the immune system of vaccinated poultry.

            However, if a chicken with poor immunity (i.e. one vaccinated with a sub-standard vaccine) is exposed to a current Asian H5N1 virus it is extremely unlikely to become a carrier – instead it will almost certainly die (as occurred with the poultry given poor quality vaccine in Liaoning Province). Poor quality vaccines may give farmers a false sense of security but these poorly protected flocks shouldn’t spread any more virus than fully susceptible non-vaccinated flocks exposed to a similar virus.

            There has been a major shift in thinking on use of vaccines for AI recently. Until the Hong Kong experience in 2002-03 (when it was apparent that the virus was endemic in the region and repeated culling was not sustainable) no one had really tried systematic vaccination against highly pathogenic avian influenza. It worked.

            The earlier policy on vaccination from international authorities were based on previous situations where the disease was newly diagnosed and recently introduced, not a situation where the virus was endemic.

            On Peter Singer’s article, it is worth noting that the vast majority of cases of HPAI now are in the backyard and scavenging/free range sector not the large “industrial” farms. In fact well managed large farms pose a much lower risk than the non-biosecure backyard farms because they can practice good biosecurity.

            Groups and indviduals who oppose industrial farming are using the current outbreaks of avian influenza to discredit this type of farming. I will not go into the merits or otherwise of their case re intensive farming but using avian influenza to attack this practice is lousy science and opportunisitic.

            萊斯·西姆斯

            #3900
            馬丁
            參與者

              再次感謝,萊斯

              正如上面的帖子中所指出的,韋伯斯特表示,使用不合格的疫苗,家禽可能不會表現出症狀,但可能攜帶H5N1 達到可傳播的水平,從而促進活體市場的傳播,即不一定會像您所說的那樣死亡。

              今天《南華早報》報導了一名中國婦女死於 H5N1 流感的消息,稱她所在的村莊沒有發現禽流感;管毅認為,這可能歸咎於假疫苗(在中國廣泛使用),雞顯然沒問題,但 H5N1 病毒的水平足夠高,足以導致傳播。

              所以,我仍然對不合格的疫苗感到好奇。
              很難看出這種 h5n1 病毒株是如何持續存在的,就像泥炭火一樣:大多數時候什麼都沒有發生,然後它就會突然爆發,也許是在相距很遠的地方。
              如果只有適當接種疫苗的雞群和未接種疫苗的雞群,我們難道不應該在接種疫苗的雞群中看到任何病毒,也不會從它們身上傳播病毒嗎?以及在其他地方持續存在的不間斷的疫情/流行病?

              有趣的是,大型農場的高致病性禽流感較少。病雞在任何可能的傳播之前註意到並清除——無論是現有的還是潛在進化的高致病性禽流感?

              馬丁

              貼文編輯:martin,發佈於:2005/11/18 07:15

              #3901
              匏名

                親愛的馬丁,

                The disease has persisted in Viet Nam since mid 2003 without the use of vaccination (only just being implemented) indicating that vaccination is not a prerequisite for persistence.

                In China and Indonesia vaccination coverage has not been 100% but in places where coverage is good, such as the flocks supplying Hong Kong (which also practice good biosecurity) the virus does not occur.

                Part of the ebb and flow in disease levels results from culling/control activities(which dampens down infection) and also from the fact that flocks with this disease may experience close to 100% mortality rates. This reduces the number of susceptible poultry in an area. However these gains are short lived if the virus is circulating elsewhere and then returns once new susceptible birds are being reared.

                Domestic ducks almost certainly play a role in persistence of H5N1 viruses as do poorly run live bird markets where virus can persist.

                Weather conditions help in that the virus survives longer in the colder months and there is also increased movement of poultry for the major Chinese/Asian festivals in the winter.

                Definite seasonal patterns occur with other diseases, including influenza in humans in which there is low level infection that flares up periodically.

                I will follow up on the comments you cite from GuanY i and RobWebster – I will try to locate the data they have to back up their claims.

                問候,

                萊斯·西姆斯

                #3902
                馬丁
                參與者

                  親愛的萊斯:

                  再次感謝你。

                  我發文的時候忘了家鴨;即使在這裡,一些 H5N1 病毒也可能致命,但也知道有時感染者沒有症狀。

                  羅伯特·韋伯斯特 (Robert Webster) 對不良疫苗的評論發表在題為“動物監測和流行病規劃中的研究問題”的演示文稿/文件中。

                  我想到了中國秋季的氣溫(讀到更多熱帶地區的雨季較涼爽,導致 H5N1 疫情可能會增加);不是節慶等活動。

                  馬丁

                  #3903
                  馬丁
                  參與者
                    引用:
                    世界禽流感專家羅伯特韋伯斯特昨天在達尼丁表示,禽流感大流行演變的關鍵階段可能會在未來幾週內在中國上演。 ……他表示,中國為 140 億隻家禽接種疫苗的運動可能會引發最壞的情況。世界末日的情景是,中國人將使用劣質疫苗,這種疫苗只會迫使病毒變異成更致命的病毒。韋伯斯特教授說:“國際社會無法知道中國是否會使用一個好的工具。” “有一個很大的論點認為,它們只會幫助病毒進化成為人類病原體。”

                    他也提到了科威特火烈鳥中的 h5n1 病毒,但沒有指出其中一隻鳥也感染了 h5n1,而那可能是一隻圈養的鳥。也沒有任何明顯的想法火烈鳥如何可能被 H5N1 感染(如果不是在貿易中)。移民潮也不會在今年秋天基本結束——這並不像他所暗示的那樣向非洲邁出了一步;今年秋天,除俄羅斯以外的亞洲地區也沒有已知野生水鳥會感染該病毒。在我看來,韋伯斯特對流感做出了巨大貢獻,但他目前有點像末日預言家,在沒有任何證據的情況下很快就將傳播歸咎於野生鳥類。儘管我不認為這會損害獲得研究經費的潛力。

                    禽流感專家表示病毒已進入關鍵階段

                    #3904
                    馬丁
                    參與者

                      即使沒有疫苗,Re病毒仍然在越南持續存在:

                      如果沒有中國作為北方鄰國,情況還會如此嗎?中國似乎是 H5N1 的主要起源地和儲存地(在獲得糧農組織讚許之前就已經接種了疫苗)。
                      – 越南的H5N1(Z)肯定首先來自中國;是只引進一次,還是不斷引進?

                      家鴨真的能成為合適的「特洛伊木馬」宿主嗎,特別是考慮到研究表明,即使在家鴨中,H5N1 病毒也可以進化成毒性較弱的形式?也就是說,如果它們是越南的主要宿主,那麼該國的 H5N1 病毒是否應該更強烈地偏離 Z 基因型?

                      已經或計劃對中國和越南之間的家禽和其他圈養鳥類的流動進行哪些研究;實際上是在這些國家和其他國家之間嗎?

                      #3905
                      匏名

                        親愛的馬丁,

                        The origin of the Vietnamese strain of H5N1 remains unknown. The viruses in Thailand and Viet Nam form a separate “clade” within the Z genoytype. This clade persisted in Vietnam throughout 2003 to 2005. Genetically it remained remarkably homogenous through 2004 although some changes are now being seen in 2005 – some through mutation and others probably through newly introduced virus.

                        Yes there is illegal movement of traffic of poultry from China into Viet Nam but this depends entirely on market conditiosn. With depressed markets in Viet Nam at present it is unlikely to be very lucrative. Nevertheless it is a potential source of new strains of virus.

                        Z genotype H5N1 viruses first appeared in domestic ducks in 2001 and seem to have survived and thrived in domestic ducks since then. There is still much we don’t understand about why certain ducks die when exposed to these viruses and others don’t. However these viruses retain their high virulence when they are introduced to chickens.

                        問候,

                        萊斯

                        #3906
                        馬丁
                        參與者

                          嗨萊斯:

                          再次感謝專家的評論。

                          我原以為所有造成麻煩的 H5N1 型大致都是 Z 型,並可追溯到 1996 年的廣東鵝(然後是 97 年的香港)。
                          顯然太簡單了——也許我應該再閱讀基因型 Z 論文和更多文章,包括我有一些你與人合著的記憶。

                          Google 搜索,大約有 88,700 個「sims h5n1」結果;包括(對於閱讀此主題的其他人):
                          亞洲高致病性H5N1禽流感的起源與演變 (摘要供大家參考)
                          最近從香港特別行政區水禽中分離出的 H5N1 流感病毒重配體 (概括)
                          1997-2002 年香港禽流感 (概括)
                          2002年香港禽流感最新狀況 (概括)

                          馬丁

                          貼文編輯:martin,發佈於:2005/11/24 09:49

                          #3907
                          匏名

                            You are right about all of these viruses being linked genetically to a goose virus from Guangdong in 1996 but there have been a number of jumps in the evolution of some strains for which the immediate precursor is not known and so we can only specualte on where they came from.

                            The paper at the following website from Emerging Infectious Diseases provides more on the various ‘clades’

                            http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol11no10/05-0644.htm

                            #3908
                            馬丁
                            參與者

                              路透社的一項研究顯示: 雞疫苗接種可以阻止禽流感的傳播 - 研究 - 接種疫苗兩週後提供最佳保護

                              ProMed 剛剛引用了有關中國家禽疫苗使用的新聞報道

                              ProMed,2005 年 11 月 26 日

                              新聞項目包括:

                              引用:
                              在周三發布的通知中,中國內閣要求地方政府支持並監督定點疫苗生產企業,嚴厲打擊制假行為。

                              – 表示假貨有重大問題。有一份主要製造商名單,其中包括一家生產活疫苗的製造商,這顯然可能會導致問題,因為病毒有可能複製並變得有毒。

                              ProMed,2005 年 3 月 8 日

                              ProMed 也發表了 David Swayne(美國家禽疾病專家)對家禽疫苗使用的長篇評論:

                              ProMed,2005 年3 月7 日——這似乎是基於美國的經驗,而不是中國的經驗,在中國,疫苗用於數以億計的家禽(這肯定會導致確保疫苗正確儲存和施用的更大困難-應該單獨接種),而且都是假貨的問題。即便如此,他指出疫苗接種並不完美,同時還需要採取其他措施。我認為對中國來說非常困難——部分原因是規模。此外,也經常採取捷徑來削減成本等(例如,一系列煤礦災難:對太多官員來說,安全並不是一個主要問題)。

                              #3909
                              匏名

                                親愛的馬丁,

                                The comment in Promed about live virus vaccines was misplaced given the only live virus vaccine being produced is a fowl pox vaccine which acts as a vector for a small part of the influenza virus.

                                This type of vaccine has been used widely elsewhere in the world and cannot revert to a virulent influenza strain.

                                萊斯

                                #3910
                                馬丁
                                參與者

                                  Item in yesterday’s South China Morning Post on vaccination of poultry in Guangdong province, quoting Yu Yedong, provincial animal inspection and quarantine inspection head.

                                  – 94% of Guangdong’s chicken population vaccinated; but shortage of vaccines meant some birds only given one shot, so may still be vulnerable to H5N1. (Best protection after booster shots given, 3-4 weeks after first ones given to 14-day old chicks.) Big farms all give two shots.
                                  A veterinary expert said two shots ok for chickens maturing in summer; three better for winter maturing birds.
                                  – Guangdong allocated several million doses of H5N1 and H5N2 vaccines a day.
                                  – Flocks for export to other than Hong Kong are not vaccinated, as some countries say that if detect antibodies they can’t tell if due to vaccines or they’re sick birds.
                                  “But Mr Yu said the administration’s own tests found that the virus was so potent that no chickens survived infection.”
                                  (Much as seems typical with infected wild birds; maybe

                                  Today’s SCMP has item with Guan Yi quoted as saying vaccinating China’s billions of poultry is impossible. Notes re no of months needed even if great many people (soldiers) vaccinating birds each day; and once done, have to start again as more chickens reared.

                                  Echoes concerns in recent news item quoting US poultry disease experts:
                                  China bird vaccination crews could spread virus
                                  Teams might carry germ farm to farm

                                  In this:

                                  引用:
                                  China’s plans to vaccinate billions of chickens against avian flu could backfire and end up spreading the disease, poultry and vaccine experts warn.

                                  Vaccination teams can easily carry the virus from farm to farm on their shoes, clothes and equipment unless they change or sterilize them each time, the experts said. That could be particularly difficult in China, where the veterinary care system is underfinanced and millions of birds are kept in small flocks by families.

                                  Also, experts said, the task is likely to be overwhelming because the Chinese eat about 14 billion chickens a year, so mass vaccinations would have to be repeated again and again, while the risk of the disease being reintroduced by migratory birds, in which it is now endemic, would be constant. [Note: seems there’s no real evidence for this assertion; I’ve emailed Carol Cardona about it, but nothing solid in reply – chiefly based on work with domestic ducks; ignoring, say, 74,000 apparently healthy wild birds tested, only one positive result – faecal sample from Mongolia]

                                  Bird vaccination campaigns involve a huge amount of labor because the animals must be injected one by one. China’s Agriculture Ministry said Tuesday that it would inject all of the nation’s 5.2 billion chickens, geese and ducks with a vaccine.

                                  Dr. Leon Russell, president of the World Veterinary Association, said that an official from Vietnam told him recently that Vietnam had despaired of ever vaccinating all its birds because it would need 100,000 more trained vaccinators.

                                  “So, for the life of me, I can’t figure out how China will vaccinate billions of chickens,” he said.

                                  Post edited by: martin, at: 2005/12/03 10:04

                                  #3911
                                  馬丁
                                  參與者

                                    Just come across two articles on factory farming of poultry; not great reading for KFC fans, or even Muslims partial to chicken (may be adulterated with pork proteins, to make meat seem better).
                                    Reading them – quickly, what with details to make you go eaaghh – seems easy to see how intensive poultry farms can become “disease factories”, as Wendy Orent writes.
                                    (tho vet Les Sims has noted above the larger farms have less problems with hpai, as can practice better biosecurity)
                                    Special Report Supermarkets: Chicken

                                    At the end, notes:
                                    ” Farm diseases are usually quite specific, and attack one type of livestock or crop. The best way to prevent them is to avoid keeping too many of the same animals together in one place, and to rotate them so that the cycle of diseases and parasites is broken. “
                                    – much like situation with wild birds [maybe resident farm sparrows differ?]; as per evolutionary biology Wendy covers (see another thread here).

                                    #3912
                                    馬丁
                                    參與者

                                      this just in:

                                      GRAIN News Release
                                      14 March 2007

                                      Bird flu: a bonanza for ‘Big Chicken’
                                      http://www.grain.org/articles/?id=22

                                      A new report by GRAIN shows how bird flu is being used to advance the
                                      interests of powerful agribusiness corporations.

                                      One year ago, when governments were fixated on getting surveillance
                                      teams into wetlands and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
                                      was waving the finger of blame at Asia and Africa’s abundant household
                                      poultry, GRAIN and other groups pointed out that large-scale
                                      industrial poultry farms and the global poultry trade were spreading
                                      bird flu — not wild birds nor backyard flocks. Today, this has become
                                      common knowledge, even though little is being done to control the
                                      industrial source of the problem, and governments still shamelessly
                                      roll out the wild bird theory to dodge responsibility
                                      .

                                      However a more sinister dimension of the bird flu crisis is becoming
                                      more apparent. Today, more than ever, agribusiness is using the
                                      calamity to consolidate its farm-to-factory-to-supermarket food chains
                                      as the small-scale competition is criminalised. Meanwhile
                                      pharmaceutical companies mine the goodwill invested in the global
                                      database of flu samples to profit from desperate, captive vaccine
                                      markets. At the centre of this story are two UN agencies (FAO and the
                                      WHO) using their international stature, access to governments and
                                      control over the flow of donor funds to advance corporate agendas.

                                      Quote from the report: “Agribusiness clearly suffers, at least in the
                                      short-term, when bird flu breaks out. But, whether in Indonesia or
                                      Russia, India or Egypt, governments and the various international
                                      agencies have quickly come to the industry’s defence, and have even
                                      managed to turn the bird flu crisis into an opportunity for the larger
                                      corporations to consolidate their control over the long term. These
                                      corporations, from CP in Thailand to Tyson in the US, have worked hard
                                      to ensure that this happens.”

                                      ==============================================

                                      Read more in “Bird flu: a bonanza for ‘Big Chicken'”, available both
                                      in PDF and as a web page:

                                      In English: http://www.grain.org/articles/?id=22

                                      In Bahasa Indonesia: http://www.grain.org/m/?id=117

                                      The report will soon be available in French and Spanish.

                                      For background information see also the GRAIN “Bird flu resource page”
                                      here: http://www.grain.org/go/birdflu

                                      #3913
                                      馬丁
                                      參與者

                                        關於中國電池農場死雞的大文章,包括:

                                        引用:
                                        如今,電池農業已成為中國的常態,但其問題也變得越來越明顯。它忽略了鳥兒的真正需求,每平方公尺塞進七到八隻鳥。為了增加產量和利潤,大量使用添加劑、抗生素和藥物——更不用說對人體健康有害的荷爾蒙了。農民自己也會承認這些問題,他們說:“我們不會吃這些雞——我們只是把它們賣到城市。”

                                        儘管農民努力防止這種情況發生,但仍有許多雞在電池農場死亡。一個大型農場會飼養 20,000 至 30,000 隻鳥,每年平均至少有 1,000 隻鳥死亡。但是所有這些屍體會怎麼樣呢?為了找到答案,我們在中國北方的一些省份進行了一項調查,結果令人不寒而慄:80%的死亡鳥類最終進入了人類食物鏈。

                                        賣烤雞的攤主也看到了從死雞或病雞身上賺取的利潤,因為它們比健康的雞便宜得多。他們選擇瀕臨死亡的雞,並儘快將它們放到烤肉叉上。下次當你在中國被街邊雞腿誘惑時,想想看。一位禽病專家曾經告訴我,他在上火車前買了一隻烤雞,震驚地發現它的心臟和肝臟中有毫米厚的黃白色蛋白質沉積物,這表明這隻雞死於感染。攤主顯然沒有時間在烹飪和出售之前將這隻鳥清洗乾淨。專家也許能夠分辨出其中的差異,但還有誰能分辨出來呢?這是他吃的最後一隻雞。

                                        那麼,當中國每年消耗47億隻雞時,我們能做什麼呢?必須把雞從籠子裡解放出來,讓它們在中國的草原、山丘、森林裡自由自在地徜徉,過上自然的生活,中國人民才放心吃雞。

                                        蔣高明,中國科學院植物研究所研究員、博士生導師,聯合國教科文組織中國人與生物圈委員會副秘書長、聯合國教科文組織人與生物圈城市小組成員。他因引入“城市植被”和“利用自然力量恢復中國生態系統”的概念而受到認可。

                                        唐愛民,中國科學發展觀研究與發展中心主任。他關於貴州如何發展知識經濟的著作受到貴州省和貴陽市領導的好評。

                                        關於死雞的真相
                                        中國每年消耗47億隻雞,其中大部分是在養殖場飼養的。但這對鳥類和人類的健康後果是什麼?姜高明和唐愛民調查中國家禽業的黑暗面。

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