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post I just made in response to a question on Agonist.org, may be of interest:
In short, yes, I do believe
Wild birds are not spreading bird flu
– not h5n1 variant that we’re so concerned about. (But they carry plenty of flus; benign for vast vast majority, till farming gets them and transforms [into frankenflus – yikes!].)
Bit longer: birds were claimed to be vectors during 2003/2004, when there was extensive spread in east and se Asia. But, nowhere did such claims look credible; instead, movements within poultry trade (including illegal, inc fighting cocks) looked way more likely. At Qinghai, I’m sure that birds spread the virus amongst each other at the colonies (eg geese defecating on grass, grazing on it). But whether any that survived will go on to become vectors remains to be seen.
After a time, what will happen to h5n1 in wild birds – will there be some evolution, even recombination, to form that is less harmful to them, and us – even unable to cross species barrier to humans? [they might be fine mixing vessels for flus, with plenty of H’s and so on – but these are for great part benign, which is a lot why birders have been little concerned re bird flu till now] I think we should then look south, along the true migration routes from Qinghai; come later autumn and winter, Indian scientists and birders will surely watch for potential vectors, see what happens. (There’s already a nice web page with h5n1 info by an Indian birder, indicating interest.) Now, with spread to Russia, I’m not certain birds haven’t moved virus over significant distances, but I think here too there is major cause for doubt.
Again, as 2003/04, timings of outbreaks go against migration routes/timings. Instead of figuring there are errors in these, maybe could look for another vector. I think the Chany Lake outbreak just might be from wild birds, but might also be that from poultry farms (run-off entering a shallow wetland, hence to food eaten/water drunk by waterfowl). [Again, timing indicates latter to me.]
For spread between farms, I believe markets etc will be mixing sources. The wild birds dying at lake in Mongolia also a concern; I’m intrigued to hear reports from team inc Wildlife Conservation Society members who were reportedly going to investigate. It’s too bad that China is so secretive about bird flu; there, I’ve seen at least one official claim of wild birds being vectors that apparently had not a shred of evidence. Russia, so far, more open, which is good (how odd to be reading reports from Pravda, on the Internet, in English!). I’ve just been cc’d an email from WWF Russia, saying,
引用：The Ministry (Agriculture) has no information about bird flu in Kursk region. Additionally, the AI was not confirmed in Kalmykia: the death of domestic birds was caused by other stomach infection.Maybe of some interest. To me, just reported outbreak in Japan (yet) again is an outbreak fitting trade – which can also involve smuggled birds (as smuggled ducks to Quemoy some time ago, with h5n1).
I’ve been in touch with/been cc’d emails from various conservation organisations, including Birds Korea, Wetlands International, Wildlife Conservation Society (international and Thailand program), WWF Hong Kong (now WWF Russia), Birdlife International, Birdlife Asia. All have similar views: wild birds can be victims, but not shown to be vectors of h5n1 (even though they – especially waterfowl – are reservoirs of flu viruses, which can become problematic thro evolution in poultry).
Also just in, email trying to check species affected at Qinghai (again, Chinese authorities could be such a help here). Based on names in a macine translated news item [posted here??]; here giving widely known English names in brackets. Some at least already named on this thread; one or two still bit baffling; I’m about to recheck thread in case more names given. Looking at numbers, striking to me just how high the proportion of bar-headed geese is; again, as faecal to oral route simpler I guess. For the gulls, I wonder if at least partly thro scavenging carcasses of dead birds. Cormorants – I don’t know, but they certainly defecate a lot when sitting around (after feeding by swimming, diving for fish). spot headed geese 5412 (Bar headed Goose) brown headed gulls 641 cormorants 1151 fishing gulls 1064 (Pallas’s Gull) red beaked diving ducks 121 (Red-crested Pochard) red feet ducks 34 (Ruddy Shelduck???) ring neck birds 23 (Common Pheasant???) swallow gulls 12 (Terns) white-headed crane 6 (Hooded Crane – unlikely on range; probably young Black-necked) Phoenix headed bird 11 (Northern Lapwing???) black neck crane 2 (Blac-necked Crane) raincoat feather crane 1 (Demoiselle Crane)
Dear Dr Martin,
I am new to your forum as a contributor but you have cited my review paper previously to support your views (Sims et al Vet Rec (2005) 157 159-164) on the routes of spread of H5N1 viruses other than wild birds.
I am a veterinarian, not an ornithologist, and have been closely involved with the avian influenza outbreaks in Asia since 1997, while working for the government in Hong Kong (1993-2002) and subsequently as a veterinary consultant working for FAO in China, Mongolia, Viet Nam, North Korea and Thailand
Firstly let me reiterate that the major route of spread of avian influenza is via infected poultry, poultry products and contaminated items associated with the industry. This is especially true once a virus is established in an area.
I have long been a sceptic of claims relating to wild birds, especially in places where the viruses are endemic in poultry, especially those with many domestic waterfowl (known “silent’ excretors in countries where the virus is endemic), and poultry are sold through poorly regulated live bird markets, providing ample opportunities for spread of the viruses.
However, there are some cases where spread via domestic poultry or trade in poultry appears extremely unlikely as the source of infection. The recent outbreak in wild birds in Mongolia, which has a tiny commercial poultry industry concentrated largely around Ulan Bator and very few “village-level” poultry, is the least convincing.
In the Mongolian case there are few plausible explanations available for the outbreak other than introduction by a wild bird. However, this raises questions as to how this occurred, especially when the timing of the outbreaks do not match the movement of migratory birds, as you have argued previously and clinically healthy birds tested so far are virus negative.
To explain this, the possibility of introduction of virus followed by silent amplification in some species for a period of time needs to be considered. Not all H5N1 viruses are uniformly fatal in ducks even though they are still highly pathogenic for other poultry (and perhaps other wild birds). Alternatively, low level mortalities in some sites could go unnoticed for a period of time and in less densely populated lakes spread would not necessarily be explosive.
I have not visited the infected wild bird sites in Mongolia or Qinghai but from information I have seen on the latter, the density of birds there would provide an ideal environment for spread and amplification of an H5N1 avian influenza virus.
All it would take for a virus to establish in such a population is the entry of one infected bird excreting virus.
We know that experimentally infected mallards can excrete Asian H5N1 virus for up to 17 days and therefore the possibility of an asymptomatic short term carrier duck introducing the virus is a possibility.
Why do we not find healthy wild birds excreting virus? Perhaps such birds are rare and our capacity to test is limited. A negative result on limited number of samples does not rule out this possiblity (e.g. if only 1 in 1000 birds were excreting virus you would need to test about 3000 birds from a population to be 95% confident that this population was free from infection). Also, if we are looking at places where virus was introduced some time ago then we may not find the original “carrier(s)”.
All of this is still speculative but there is a genuine need to explain the origin of the outbreaks in wild birds in places such as Mongolia. The above explanation appears the most plausible after considerable thought on the issue.
Finally I would like to add a few comments on vaccination of poultry, of which you have been critical.
The situation in a number of countries in the region is such that vaccination is the only rational course of action to reduce the levels of viral excretion and contamination. This in turn reduces the likelihood of infection of wild birds.
H5N1 is not going to be eradicated from Asia for a long time and we need to use all of the tools at our disposal. Vaccination will remain, in my view, the most valuable of these especially in places where there are large numbers of scavenging poultry forming a key part of village economies that cannot be reared in biosecure facilities.
親切的問候，
萊斯·西姆斯
嗨萊斯：
非常感謝您的貼文；非常歡迎您發表這樣的知情評論。
是的，蒙古湖令人費解。我從野生動物保護協會團隊那裡看到了更多調查此事的信息，他們也不確定發生了什麼，不過野鳥帶著 h5n1 飛了一段距離看起來是最合理的原因。 （提到美國[家禽]爆發高致病性禽流感，可追溯到空家禽板條箱被運輸一段距離——當然不是這裡發生的事情，但確實表明可能會發生奇怪的事情。）
時機確實很奇怪。我認為，當 2 隻天鵝和 1 隻鵝死亡時，大天鵝和斑頭雁就會定居（繁殖）。
所以，也許它們被病毒感染了，這種病毒已經持續了幾週，也可能在幾隻鳥之間傳播。
我聽說鴨子除毛長達 17 天；而且青海變種（可能與蒙古/俄羅斯的變種幾乎相同/可能不完全相同）比中國團隊之前測試過的h5n1更具致命性——在20小時內殺死了8隻雞中的8只，因此鴨子可能更難生存和棚子。
埃爾克赫爾 (Erkhel) 有一些夏季旅遊項目；疫情爆發可能與此有關嗎？沒有證據;但幾乎是合理的。
再次，需要更多資訊。
但是，h5n1 顯然還沒有在這裡的野鳥中很好地傳播；看起來更像是除青海以外的其他已知的野外疫情。青海頗為奇特；據報道有這麼多的鳥類被殺死；而且事後缺乏我所看到的資訊（有多少隻鳥倖存下來？比如說；一些過於熱心的官員不可能選擇撲殺[後來在疫情爆發時，有報道稱撲殺是反對的]？
也感謝您對疫苗接種的評論。我從《新科學家》獲取了信息，並從糧農組織網站上獲取了一些信息（糧農組織也許不太情願地同意更廣泛地接種 h5n1 疫苗？）。
在您所提及的情況下，似乎應謹慎使用疫苗接種；但中國（尤其是——我相信香港家禽，例如，現在已經接種疫苗）現在廣泛使用。
對我來說，這可以解釋1996年來自廣東的家鵝樣本中的h5n1為何在我們身邊停留了這麼久；其他高致病性禽流感疫情，例如在荷蘭導致獸醫死亡的 H7N7 病毒，顯然是透過屠宰受感染的家禽而根除的。 1997 年，香港似乎同樣成功地透過屠宰家禽來根除 h5n1，但它顯然在其他地方倖存下來，包括中國南部。此資訊在這裡可能有用，以免其他人遇到此線程]。馬丁
Wow. Where has this forum been? I found it by accident while arguing with a certain Dr elsewhere. The spread from Qinghai is so closley matched to the bike race there that I’m thinking that it’s one and the same. The more that I look at dates and number of people- including their geographical range – it appears that it is a part of the spread.
I know about the initial infections before the race found in the Chany Lake area. That area is actually (for those who don’t know) made up of several hundred lakes and thousands of ponds. There are also more than one lake that shares Chany’s name. Chany is the largest lake.
I believe that it’s mostly smuggling. People take for granted that I mean bird smuggling. Not at all, I’m talking about H5N1 smuggling in on wet items. Birds, shirts, tires and feet. Anything that took a run over infected feces or dead birds. H5N1 can remain viable for many months in a cold wet place.
The rest is explained through plain economics in the farmer’s hands. One bird or your neighbor’s birds get sick, run far away and sell yours now. Maybe ask a far away cousin to keep them with their birds.
I can explain this a hundred ways faster than I can a wild bird approaching a domesticated bird area. Have you ever seen dog approach another dog’s yard? Try that on a rooster or goose. Same result. A fight.
That’s enough for now. Time to read…
LMc
嗨劉易斯：
謝謝你的貼文。
嗯，如果沒有更多信息，例如自行車比賽路線、時間安排以及這些信息與疫情的相關性，我想知道這一點。
至於走私——對我來說似乎是可能的。我讀到禽流感病毒可以在家禽糞便中存活 100 天。但不確定這又可以進行什麼。
馬丁
I know. I don’t explain myself very well. I meant that after the race, in that exact area where the die-off occurred – 750,000 to 1 million people left the area. Competitors from every single "new" area of H5N1 discovered in the next weeks was there at the race. Bike teams have huge support groups with many vehicles. It rained the last day of the race, and it was called off because of the cold. Mud, cold temps, travel to far away places, H5N1 found in those far away places – out of sync with normal migration cycles for those areas. Here’s some reference material trying to make my theory stick around from Canada on their report of avian flu:
Feb 15, 2005 The movement of buyers from farm to farm in conducting egg pickup can lead to biosecurity breaches and inadvertent disease transmission to a flock. Transmission of contaminated manure from an infected premises to a separate susceptible flock can an occur through the movement of people, equipment and vehicles. Barn to barn movement constitutes the highest risk activity for transfer, while deposition of contaminated manure in the vicinity of asusceptible flock is categorized as of somewhat lesser risk. It is thought that a small amount of contaminated dust adhering to boots, clothing or equipment is sufficient to transmit the virusfrom an infected barn to a susceptible flock. Lewis Mc
再次感謝，劉易斯。
沒想到自行車比賽是如此盛大的活動。
因此，我認為競爭對手來自俄羅斯、哈薩克和蒙古。但是，來自疫情爆發的地區──如恰尼湖、埃爾克赫爾（或附近）？我仍然想知道；這些人是否真的接觸過青海地區的家禽群（看來野鳥疫情僅限於保護區），或是接觸過感染物質？
（或者可能有價格優惠的家禽/雞蛋嗎？）感謝您連結到加拿大報告—顯示禽流感的傳播可能是一個複雜的問題。
可惜最近爆發的訊息太少。不過，令人高興的是，對我來說，疫情正在消退，這進一步表明野鳥並不是關鍵媒介。
馬丁
Les –
For my view, I try to just ignore what emotion I read and pick out the facts and then come back to take the messages I read in context. People are surprised about the race because China is supposed to be straw hats and shanty villages. Qinghai is far from that. It is a large city with highrises and part of the 6 or 8 lane freeway going in that crosses over the borders there. I think it’s called the millineum highway. It’s going in because so many people go that way already – hence my belief in travel and not wild birds spreading H5N1.
“Chaney Lake” is like saying Michigan lake. Oceanliners can cross there. It’s huge. Chaney lake is actually hundreds of lakes, several of which include the name Chaney. I’m not sure about ocean liners on Chaney
, but the point is that it’s a country sized lake surrounded by “smaller lakes” that you can’t see across because of the size.I am really trying to find out where these poeple lived, but it’s hundreds of people, and Mongolia isn’t known for it’s white pages online. I am not going to contact the race teams individually. They keep online diaries that should help.
H5N1 at Qinghai was absolutely lethal to birds. Qinghai does not have 750,000 hotel rooms. You can see from the race pictures that people sat on the lake shore and probably camped there. Birds get fed here in the states by people, so that may have happend, its normal to assume that. Macroviewing scenarios is a bad thing to do though. I prefer to just point out the facts of the race crowd numbers, lack of hotel rooms, location of the race route, and where everyone went after the race. The weather was my best clue for H5N1 to survive leaving the area.
Lewis Mc
PS – It’s been 100 months since the first human H5N1 confirmed death. I was wondering when H5N1 was first discovered in birds?
路透社警報網標題為「貧窮的亞洲農民是禽流感鬥爭中的薄弱環節」的項目包括：
引用：世衛組織西太平洋區域主任尾江茂博士說：「我們需要認識到，農民報告疑似疫情的動力非常小。」西太平洋區域覆蓋了 37 個亞洲和太平洋國家。奧米在南太平洋新喀裡多尼亞首都努美阿舉行的世界衛生組織西太平洋年度會議開幕式上表示：「事實上，擔心雞群可能在沒有補償的情況下被撲殺，是報告疫情的一個相當大的阻礙因素。”– 這將有助於模糊 h5n1 的真實情況。 （至少有一些官員保密，畫面確實相當混亂。但是，野鳥似乎總是準備好作為替罪羊！）
在世衛組織主任（我認為是李）似乎漫不經心地指責野生鳥類在各地傳播潛在的流行病並因此成為頭條新聞之後，這裡有一個經過深思熟慮、遠不那麼成為頭條新聞的觀點。埋藏在路透社警報網的報導中，世界阻止禽流感流行的機會渺茫
引用：大谷仁博士曾奮戰在對抗非典的前線，現在領導亞洲對抗禽流感的鬥爭。世界衛生組織亞洲傳染病專家大谷說：“回想起來，非典是一種很容易遏制的病毒。” ……禽流感已經從亞洲向西傳播到俄羅斯，許多人擔心候鳥會將病毒傳播到歐洲，甚至可能透過阿拉斯加傳播到美國。但 Oshitani 對候鳥對禽流感傳播的影響表示懷疑，他說 H5N1 病毒的不同亞型存在於亞洲和俄羅斯。 「這場流行病有很多不確定性。我們不知道它將如何開始。我們不知道它到底是如何傳播的，」他說。Now the Silk Road has generated H5N1 in Turkey. You have to cross that part over the mountains before winter arrives.
How do Birds get onto an island? It must be by flying? http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2005/oct/20/health.birdflu
Taiwan today became the latest country to announce the discovery of bird flu. Authorities said the H5N1 virus was found among birds on a Panama-registered freighter that was stopped by the Taiwanese coast guard on October 14. Spokesman Sung Hua-tsung said the freighter was carrying 1,037 smuggled birds – consisting of 19 species – all of which originated in China.
謝謝你，劉易斯；有助於顯示非法貿易可以傳播這種流感。
華南早報今天的報導包括：
從中國大陸走私至台灣的 1037 批禽鳥中，46 隻鳥中的 8 隻檢測出 H5N1 病毒呈陽性。共19種，寵物店用；包括八哥、黑枕黃鷂和北京知更鳥（紅嘴相思鳥）。 [由於八哥在中國的分佈範圍相當有限，不知道是否有一些原本來自東南亞？]Another one, like I really need to do this over and over.
TONGZHOU, China (AP) – Two men in masks and protective suits guarded the border between Beijing and Hebei province, watching for vehicles transporting live poultry under anti-bird flu measures announced Monday to protect the capital. Only shipments of live chickens, ducks and geese from three certified Hebei farms are allowed in, said Tian Zhigang, an animal quarantine officer at the Baimiao Inspection Station. So I'm thinking, if its all wild birds, why are the authorities watching the roads? Could it be both. 2% to 3% wild birds at a short distance, getting infected by the 100% of H5N1 positive chickens, ducks and geese as they migrate along the farms. Wild birds are going to really take a beating over this, for real. You should see what we did to Canadian Geese up here in one year. I use to see hundreds at a time, now I don't see them at all.
哦，重複多少次再交易等似乎並不重要；野生鳥類在塞勒姆鳥類審判中被判有罪。
今天的《華南早報》刊登了世界銀行和三個聯合國食品和衛生機構（但沒有聯合國保護機構）召集的 H5N1 會議的結論。
稱行動計畫包括「研究候鳥模式以預測哪些國家接下來將出現 H5N1 病例」。
沒關係，仍然缺乏證據證明野生鳥類確實攜帶H5N1——為什麼沒有研究，比如說，為什麼H5N1 在2003/2004 年在亞洲如此普遍，今年春季和夏季在亞洲爆發了一些疫情，但2003 年春季和夏季卻沒有報告野生水鳥爆發疫情。今年秋天亞洲（或俄羅斯、羅馬尼亞和克羅埃西亞以外的任何地方）？
事實上，為什麼一些「專家」（嗯）預計 H5N1 會在現在左右到達非洲，而候鳥甚至無法將其傳播到亞洲各地？行動計劃顯然不包括對合法和非法家禽貿易以及野鳥貿易的研究——儘管確實有證據表明這可以長距離傳播禽流感。奇怪的是。
（在這一切中，世界自然保護聯盟在哪裡？糧農組織盡最大努力免除農業和指責鳥類的責任——當然可以採取一些平衡嗎？）哦，重複多少次再交易等似乎並不重要；野生鳥類在塞勒姆鳥類審判中被判有罪。
今天的《華南早報》刊登了世界銀行和三個聯合國食品和衛生機構（但沒有聯合國保護機構）召集的 H5N1 會議的結論。
稱行動計畫包括「研究候鳥模式以預測哪些國家接下來將出現 H5N1 病例」。
沒關係，仍然缺乏證據證明野生鳥類確實攜帶H5N1——為什麼沒有研究，比如說，為什麼H5N1 在2003/2004 年在亞洲如此普遍，今年春季和夏季在亞洲爆發了一些疫情，但2003 年春季和夏季卻沒有報告野生水鳥爆發疫情。今年秋天亞洲（或俄羅斯、羅馬尼亞和克羅埃西亞以外的任何地方）？
事實上，為什麼一些「專家」（嗯）預計 H5N1 會在現在左右到達非洲，而候鳥甚至無法將其傳播到亞洲各地？行動計劃顯然不包括對合法和非法家禽貿易以及野鳥貿易的研究——儘管確實有證據表明這可以長距離傳播禽流感。奇怪的是。
（在這一切中，世界自然保護聯盟在哪裡？糧農組織盡最大努力免除農業和指責鳥類的責任——當然可以採取一些平衡嗎？）I’ve now read what feels like hundreds of threads with conflicting information. I think it’s best to just keep on top of the news and take precauions.
Just read about 2 new cases in China
no spam thanks
馬丁
Post edited by: martin, at: 2005/11/12 14:28
Link to news item – Sun Nov 27, 2005
Experts say flu fears over wild birds over-stated
喬
Post edited by: jodd, at: 2005/11/27 21:50
Post edited by: jodd, at: 2005/11/27 21:51
嗨喬：
非常感謝您發布此內容；在媒體中看到一些意義令人耳目一新（偶爾會發生）。估計記者/編輯會想知道，現在禽流感還沒有隨著秋季遷徙到非洲、西歐等地。
對於不訪問連結的任何人，專案開始：
引用：台灣台南（路透社）—專家表示，關於遷徙野鳥將在世界各地傳播致命禽流感病毒的擔憂幾乎沒有科學證據，而且它們感染人類的可能性更加渺茫。參加本週在台灣舉行的國際水鳥協會會議的專家表示，H5N1高致病性禽流感菌株的最大威脅來自家禽，而不是野生鳥類。
馬丁
剛收到路透社報道中提到的同一次會議上某人發來的電子郵件，他說有報告稱，從澳大利亞和新西蘭向北到蒙古，向西到法國的野生鳥類中檢測到了 H5N1。超過 73,000 個樣本，其中只有一個來自蒙古糞便樣本的 HPAI - H5N1 呈陽性。
《中國日報》有關野生鳥類被錯誤指控的相關新聞：
候鳥被冤枉包括：
引用：「候鳥可能是媒介，但有證據表明這種情況非常罕見，它們更經常是HP H5N1 的受害者，」總部位於美國的國際野生動物保護協會(WCS) 亞洲項目主任科林·普爾(Colin Poole)去年告訴《中國日報》一週的北京研討會。…
英國非政府組織東方鳥類俱樂部前主席、英國科學家普爾表示，許多人收集的數據顯示，感染H5N1的鳥類大多是留鳥，而不是遷徙。
在大多數情況下，受感染的野鳥生活在家禽養殖場附近。
而野生鳥類的遷徙路線與禽流感的發生模式並不相符。[/url]
Gov’t Worried About Underground Routes That Could Spread Bird Flu
created: 11/30/2005 6:14:54 PM
updated: 11/30/2005 6:22:57 PMBy Investigative Reporter Leisa Zigman
I-Team
KSDK-Fears of a global killer flu, whether likely or not, have forced local, state, and federal officials to create pandemic emergency plans.The I-Team recently obtained internal government documents that detail what officials aren’t telling us. The documents detail the underground routes the virus is predicted to take to spread into North America.
One route poses a chilling threat to Missouri and Illinois. It involves animal swap meets where birds and other animals are bought and sold like items at a flea market.
Sunday, we took hidden cameras into what Illinois agriculture officials call an illegal animal swap meet. Experts tell the I-Team the majority of people who buy and sell at swap meets are legitimate.
But they also say swap meets provide the perfect venue for smugglers.
Please read the rest at the link. I didn’t want to push the limit here for page length.
thanks; interesting.
包括：“We now have more smuggled birds coming into the United States than we do legal birds. I call them the bird Mafia.”
Here is a report – based on microbiologic findings- suggesting H5N1 like configurated strains could become the dominant serotype in wild birds:
Recombination And Reassortment In H5N1 In China
By Dr. Henry L. Niman, PhD12-2-5
http://www.rense.com/general69/recom.htm
Four complete sequences from tree sparrows in Henan, China (A/Tree sparrow/Henan/1/2004(H5N1), A/Tree sparrow/Henan/2/2004(H5N1), A/Tree sparrow/Henan/3/2004(H5N1), A/Tree sparrow/Henan/4/2004(H5N1)) have been deposited at GenBank. These 2004 isolates are reassortants with H5and N1 on the outside and sequences related to H9N2 on the inside, similar to the 1997 isolates linked to the Hong Kong outbreak. Thus, although 1.5 million birds were culled in Hong Kong in 1997, related sequences were circulating in wild birds in China. The four sequences share polymorphisms with the 1997 isolates as well as 2000-2001 H5N1 isolates from Hong Kong. These “older” sequences however are present in 2004 tree sparrow isolates. One of the 2004 isolates also has the 20 amino acids in NA that are deleted in the Z genotype. These isolates also still have PB2 E627 and although they are pathogenic to chickens, they are not pathogenic in ducks or mice. However, these sequences may be endemic in China, offering genetic variations used in the evolution of H5. Indeed there are also polymorphisms found in LPAI H’s recently deposited. These H5N3 and H5N2 serotypes are from ducks and swans in Mongolia and Japan. They also share polymorphisms with H5 isolates from Primorie and northern Europe, which identify an additional northern migratory pathway stretching from Sweden to Japan. The presence of HPAI H5N1 in tree sparrows also raises the possibility that the dominant wild bird serotype in Asia, LPAI H9N2, is being replace by HPAI H5N1. Moreover, this indigenous HPAI H5N1 is assuming several configurations via reassortment, and acquiring novel polymorphisms via recombination. These genetic changes may be contributing to the lack of effectiveness of vaccines in China and the mismatches may be driving genetic diversity. These new sequences from China also highlight the need for wider surveys of wild bird populations, including water fowl and well as local terrestial birds. Screening and publishing of these sequences will aid in the development of effective vaccines to better control the accelerating evolution of H5 in Asia and throughout the world.Oh dear oh dear, more Nonsense from Niman; though yes, not his worst by a long stretch: see Henry Niman – prophet of doom for the Internet thread on this forum for some examples (This forum isn’t the place for purported sense by Niman, not until appears in peer-reviewed journal and/or Niman actually does some research instead of just sitting at computer posting so much codswallop on Internet. Though it’s bizarre he still bothers with wild birds, since on Planet Niman the human H5N1 pandemic began by 6 April 2005; soon after which, concerns re Ebola and H5N1 mixing. Not to mention bioterrorists using pigs to transport a flu to kill America’s mice. Oh, I said not to mention that; sorry). Good grief, look at this post by N. Fragments of information, and he paints a picture (what’s this about "an additional northern migratory pathway stretching from Sweden to Japan." Can he actually believe this, or does Niman laugh as he posts his drivel, thinking of the people who’ll be taken in by it?) So, H5N1 is becoming harmless to wild birds is it? Aargh, gotta stop shortly; Nimanism makes me feel bilious just reading it (haven’t added to prophet of doom thread lately, as been avoiding Nimanism mostly of late; but if anyone has good new additions, would be welcome). See also thread 野鳥專家並非主要 h5n1 病毒攜帶者
I have to apologize, I have not been aware of existing allergies and unwritten guidelines in this forum
What you state may be right, but this does not necessarily mean everything Niman writes is fundamentaly wrong. Nor is it with the article. There can be doubt on the existence of LPAI H5N1 strains*), and on the basis of the present knowledge nobody can rule out the possibility of evolution towards increasing prevalence of H5N1 LPAI strains in wild birds
As everybody in thi sforum knows recent studies show that minimal variation of aminacids in the HA cleavage site or other structures like PB 2 is an important determinant to host specifity and virulence.
引用：Nimanism makes me feel bilious just reading itThere is no need to get choleric about anything in this issue *)
Ah, too bad you hadn’t seen the Henry Niman – Prophet of Doom thread. So much of what Niman writes is wrong that best ignored if possible. So much blame from him for wild birds spreading H5N1 with no real evidence (and main evidence to contrary); it’s not as tho Niman’s a polite fellow; way too much clutter of flu threads elsewhere with Nimanism. Bah! Two findings of LPAI H5N1 strains in wild birds that I know of (another in mallard, US, 1986; tho seems to me there’s more evidence of such strains since HPAI H5N1 has developed in poultry before). Both ducks, not "wild birds" in general. For H5N1 to become non virulent in wild birds, need considerable evolution; not seeing this in wild (and there is considerable testing; also lack of wild bird deaths from H5N1 pretty near everywhere). Lower path H5N1 in domestic/experimental ducks in low titres cloaca; ducks don’t French kiss and I’ve never seen wild ducks sneeze, so spreading it tough. Swans in Croatia also low titres cloaca; other birds on ponds with them not infected [source of the swans infection a mystery: why swans here, Volga, predominating among the – rather few – wild birds affected in Romania?] With H5N1 of Guangdong goose 96 lineage in poultry so virulent, I’ll say it is not going to happen. Once into wild, natural selection stops it pretty near dead in its tracks. (Those tree sparrows odd; but many questions raised, inc re poultry in vicinity.) [May be shift if get much longer time with H5N1, and perhaps find things happen as China carries out massive poultry vaccinations. But I doubt it.]
I roughly agree.
The problem is we are struggling over here on a local basis for bird protection and are constantly confronted with this kind of stuff. There seems to be no way to get through the firewall of ignorance and indolence.
There is nothing but waiting for better data. Is there really something under way?.
I was just reading the last OIE romania report: mode of transmission: wild birds. The story started in october, lots of dead or sick birds should lay around all over. Biomonitoring should show ample data.
To me there is no other rationalWhy are people who’s livelihood is paid by the public allowed to maintain such stuff?
I think the pathogenicity of HPAI strains will decrease rather sooner than later for the simple reason the HPAI configuration does not represent the best chance of (long terme) survival for the AIV. There may occur interference on multiple levels. The second reason is also the most virulent strain will not be able to keep its profile and be subject to genetic alteration
The thrill is we don’t know the scenario
Thanks for this interesting and encouraging thread
Hi Gänseerpel:
“Mode of transmission: wild birds” seems typical; yet when try looking into reasons for this, eividence can seem weak, or non-existent (seen wild birds blamed for, say, outbreak in poultry in Xinjiang – and no wild birds in report to OIE).
Guan Yi perhaps has best handle on data; see comments by experts thread, where he says wild birds not responsible for spread.
Les Sims comments to this forum (thread on farming) also of interest: he too has massive experience with H5N1, inc working for FAO.Indeed, you would figure dead wild birds should be all over Romania esp Danube Delta; trail of bodies from Russia (yet not sure if birds here were from affected parts of Russia; Croatia’s swans, say, from Europe – at least one being well during stopover in Hungary).
Have you also seen my piece on dead ducks not flying, via links at left (bird flu n wild birds) – on 2003/04 outbreaks in Asia, and wild birds victims, not vectors.
H5N1 isn’t novelty here in Asia (I’m in Hong Kong). Yet, this autumn/winter, no reports in wild waterbirds in Asia ex-Russia – which is surely hugely significant.
In Hong Kong, had occasional wild birds die, found to have H5N1 – first in 2002, but no spread, no excess deaths, no H5N1 found in healthy wild bird despite testing (over 16,000 birds in past two years). Potent evidence I think that H5N1 is not and cannot become established in wild birds.Indeed frustrating people like Joseph Domenech of FAO can blame wild birds so readily with such scant evidence.
H5N1 pathogenicity can be sustained only in poultry, I believe; maybe poor vaccines are helping with this. (Thread on evolutionary biology of relevance here. Helps explain why true wild birds flus are mild.)
[Tho I’m less clued up than you re configurations.]Glad you find this thread of use.
馬丁
, but the point is that it’s a country sized lake surrounded by “smaller lakes” that you can’t see across because of the size.
- 抱緊，回歸主題必須先登錄。